

THE MIDSOUTH POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

VOLUME 5, 2001

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REPRESENTATION IN PROFESSIONAL AND CITIZEN STATE LEGISLATURES: A CAUSAL ANALYSIS

Mark C. Ellickson
Southwest Missouri State University

Donald E. Whistler
University of Central Arkansas

ABSTRACT

Based on data collected from a nationwide survey of over 2,400 state legislators, this study utilizes path analysis to ascertain the causal linkages of legislators' individual characteristics and perceptions, district circumstances, and internal legislative positions in professional and citizen state legislatures upon their casework activity levels. Major differences between the two types of legislatures included: (1) race played a much larger role in the professional model than in the citizen model; (2) majority party status was more important in the professional model; and (3) in professional legislatures where staff support is greater, staff was more likely to be used for assistance in bill preparation, not casework; while in citizen legislatures, where staff support is extremely limited, it tends to be utilized in more of a casework capacity. Regardless of legislative setting, the most powerful predictor of time spent on casework was a member's perception of their constituents' attitudes toward casework; and, members' bill-passage activities impacted negatively on their casework emphasis.

INTRODUCTION

State legislators have been performing the representational activities of lawmaking and constituency service at increasing rates (Rosenthal 1998, ch.1). And while lawmaking remains the principal representational activity of state legislators (Patterson 1996; Frantzich 1979), constituency services have become increasingly important.¹ Considerable variation, however, exists among state legislatures with regard to legislators' representational activity levels (Freeman and Richardson 1994; Jewell 1982); moreover, contradictory evidence exists as to the relationship between legislators' level of lawmaking versus constituency services: Cavanagh (1979) reported that performing lawmaking activities diminished congresspersons' service activities, whereas Johannes found a slight positive relationship between the levels of representatives' lawmaking and their constituency service (1984, 157).² Additionally, a recent review of state legislative research (Moncrief, Thompson, and Cassie 1996, 316-317) concluded that studies explaining variation in constituency service have remained curiously absent since the topic was first broached by Jewell (1982) in the early 1980s; nor has there been any published research that examines the relationship between state legislators' levels of lawmaking and constituency service activities. In this article, we utilize path analysis to evaluate the causal linkages of legislators' individual characteristics and perceptions, district circumstances, and leadership positions in professional and citizen state legislatures upon members' bill-passage and casework activity levels.

SYMBIOTIC REPRESENTATION

Politics in a democracy is a symbiotic relationship between the represented and their representatives. Constituents contact their representatives and request information and assistance in dealing with government agencies, redressing grievances, and acquiring government jobs, etc. In turn, lawmakers comply because they sense, rightly or wrongly, that constituency service will help them electorally (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Rosenthal 1993, 128-129).

The "simple demand" concept of elections--that the electorate votes for candidates because it demands specific public policies and punishes electorally public officials who do not enact those policies--approaches representation from the viewpoint of the demands of the represented. However, the simple demand perspective fails to address the massive evidence of citizen disinterest, ignorance, and nonparticipation that permeates the public (Eulau and Wahlke 1978, 74-75). Fenno's investigation of the U.S. House of Representatives further revealed the weakness of this approach as he notes that the representative-constituency linkage is more than just policy congruence, it also involves casework and acquisition of resources (1978). In other words, representational activities are undertaken not only because of demand from the represented, but also because of the supply of services to the electorate by representatives. The "supply" of services from careerist or professional representatives has had, in recent decades, an enormous impact upon legislative representation (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1987, 15, 217; Eulau and Prewitt, 1973, 457-459; Jewell 1982, 22; Rosenthal 1998, 15-18). Consequently, service activities appear to have become a very important, if not the predominant representational activity of most state legislators, with a few senior-level legislators (and the governor) expected to shoulder responsibility for state-wide public policy concerns (Jewell 1982, 94; Rosenthal 1990).

STATE LEGISLATIVE STRUCTURES

The structure of state legislatures may be conceptualized on a continuum from a professional to a citizen model of organization. Professional legislatures are characterized by annual sessions, full-time and well-paid legislators, and larger staffs. Conversely, citizen legislatures are characterized by biannual sessions or at least not year-around legislative sessions, legislators whose personal careers are outside the legislature and whose legislative pay is insufficient to constitute a career, and where staffers are few (Rosenthal 1996a). Some one-fifth of state legislatures may be considered professional (p.110).

By definition, professional legislators are careerists. Not only have many state legislators become heavily careerist, but state legislators have significantly increased their expression of ambition for public office (Rosenthal 1996a, 114-116). Turnover rates, once high in state legislatures, have been declining sharply for several decades (Patterson 1996, 180). Turnover in the most professional state legislatures is somewhat lower than in most citizen state legislatures (Rosenthal 1996b), although southern citizen legislatures have historically had consistently low turnover rates (Rosenthal 1981, 136-137).

At first glance, the lack of electoral competition would appear to destroy the possibility of electoral sanctions against state legislators. Typically nearly three-fourths of incumbents run for reelection and greater than 90 percent of them win (Moncrief, Squire, and Jewell 2001, 4,8); indeed, some three-fourths of seats are considered electorally safe (Rosenthal 1998, 67). However, most state representatives feel electorally insecure no matter their margin of victory in campaigns (Cohen 1984, 365-369; Jewell 1982, 47). The more they have to lose, the harder incumbents run; and professional legislators have the most to lose (Rosenthal 1998, 60).

Reducing electoral uncertainty becomes the primary strategy. This is most readily accomplished by representatives constantly campaigning by performing services for constituents at taxpayers' expense--especially in professional legislature states where campaign costs have skyrocketed (Rosenthal 1996a, 119).

STATE LEGISLATIVE SETTINGS

Legislative Districts: Professional state legislatures contain a greater number of diverse and competing interests; consequently they enact more laws (Rosenthal 1998, 123-124) and have more requests for casework than do citizen state legislatures (Freeman and Richardson 1994). In part, this is because of their setting within more heavily populated, urban, and diverse situations--more people with more varied interests are likely to make more requests/demands. There is also a larger volume of requests for services--for public money, projects, programs, and casework--especially from lower socioeconomic districts (Jewell 1982). Yet individual legislative districts, even within the more diverse professional legislatures, often contain a dominant interest (Jewell 1982, 103), an interest which state legislators understand and which most members share (Jewell 1982, 79-85, 131). Because members of professional legislatures are more concerned with winning reelection and establishing careers in public office, they are thought to be more inclined to attempt to satisfy their constituents' desires (Rosenthal 1981, 59; Rosenthal 1998).

Additionally, districts that contain interests with greater resources and more diverse policy and service needs are motivated to organize and articulate their interests to public officials. The extent to which groups are organized and able to articulate their demands to legislators is basic to legislators' performing service activities for them (Thomas and Hrebener 1996). The intensity with which well-organized groups pursue even the most non-salient of issues can force legislators to pay close attention to their requests (Rosenthal 1981). Thus, legislators (professional or citizen) from districts where groups are organized and attentive should place more emphasis on the representational activities that are demanded by constituents.

Institutional Legislative Assets: Legislators occupying leadership positions are generally expected not to operate the legislature for their personal benefit (Jewell 1982, 139-141). However, the use of leadership positions for partisan electoral benefits is increasing in the professional legislatures; partisan control of leadership has been used increasingly as a tactic to benefit majority members in the next election (Rosenthal 1993, 131). At the same time, the professionalization of state legislatures has encouraged independence among rank-and-file members and thus weakened the overall power of legislative leaders (Jewell and Whicker 1994, 50-52).

Political party competition is greatest for seats in the professional legislatures of the more urbanized, industrialized states; and subsequently, political parties serve as institutional conflict resolution mechanisms within the professional legislatures. Thus, especially in professional legislatures, majority party members are advantaged in having the capacity to dominate leadership positions (e.g., speaker and committee chairs) and to enact legislative preferences and pursue constituency services. The more numerous staff of professional legislatures is an additional resource that can be potentially employed for partisan purposes. Whether possession of legislative positions and staff increase time spent on service to constituents (casework) is not entirely clear, but it would appear reasonable to expect that majority party status and the possession of formal leadership positions, along with control of additional staffers would enhance representational efforts.

Party competition is often weak in citizen-type state legislatures where the typically highly homogeneous districts produce a common set of interests and accompanying life-style

which do not require formal institutionalized conflict resolution in the form of political parties. Instead, within citizen legislatures the loosely organized (and often one-party dominant systems) parties are organizations that articulate the consensus within the districts by means of elections which place the community's support behind those who share, and volunteer to articulate (as legislators), the community's preferences to the legislature. Nominally citizen legislatures also are organized on the basis of majority-minority political party; however, partisanship is often very low. Here networking replaces party. (Of course, networking within a majority party of a professional legislature may occur.) Networking, then, especially within citizen legislatures, would appear to be an important aspect of potential impact upon demands for higher levels of representational activities.

Individual Legislator Differences: While belief in the need for constituency service to get reelected is widespread among representatives from all states (Patterson 1996, 182-183; Rosenthal 1993, 129), the levels of representational roles differ among state legislators (Jewell 1982, 164). There are differences among individual legislators in their propensity to do casework (Freeman and Richardson 1996). Less senior and more ambitious members of professional state legislatures more vigorously pursue constituency services (Jewell 1982, 76). Minority and female representatives are thought to process more constituency services (Thomas 1992); but they are also more likely to represent urban districts from which a greater volume of demands emanate (Nelson 1991, 27, 45). Also of importance in differences among individual legislator's service activities are the attitudes of individual legislators toward performing service activities (Jewell and Patterson 1986, 75). For example, Freeman and Richardson (1996, 49) observed that legislators who "place a high value on casework are far more likely to spend time on it."

MODEL AND EXPECTATIONS


Legislators whose political ambition is to obtain and retain public office are likely to calculate the costs and benefits of constituency service on their future electoral success (Eulau and Prewitt 1973, 446-449). This linkage process involves a combination of electoral competition and certain personal attitudes among representatives (e.g., desire to remain in office). In taking legislative actions, representatives consider constituents' preferences (Miller and Stokes 1963, 46-56). These actions take place within the legislative arena where access to institutional positions and resources may influence the legislator's options on bill-passage and casework. Moreover, the legislators may find that efforts at bill-passage interfere with casework.

Our expectations for members of professional legislatures are that they should be higher on ambition for office and resulting efforts to do what constituents are perceived to want. Moreover, their internal decision making should be more oriented toward conflict resolution, with majority party membership exerting greater importance. The formal positions and availability of staff should be mediating factors benefiting their possessors. The amount of time consumed in bill activity should affect casework, especially in professional legislatures where the volume of requests is expected to be greater; staff availability is anticipated to mitigate legislators' time spent on casework. Finally, we place legislators' perceptions of constituents' casework expectations as an exogenous variable in our present model; research predicts it to more strongly impact within professional legislatures (Freeman and Richardson 1992, 5; Jewell 1982, 142; Rosenthal 1989, 84).

The overall model for this study is displayed in Figure 1 below. We treat individual, institutional, and district characteristics as exogenous variables. The institutional characteristics

of formal position and staff size are treated as endogenous variables, along with bill activity. Casework emphasis is the dependent variable.

FIGURE 1. Hypothesized Causal (Path) Model



DATA COLLECTION

The units of analysis in this study were members in 1991 of the lower chambers of eight state legislatures. We employ Peverill Squire's (1992, 70-71) measure of professionalism in state legislatures to identify professional and citizen legislatures. His interval ranking is based upon "member pay, staff members per legislator, and total days in session" (p. 71). To achieve maximum contrast between the two types of legislatures, the top four states in terms of Squire's ranking of professionalism were selected and combined into one group (New York, Michigan, California, and Massachusetts). According to Squire's index, these four legislatures are clearly the most professional bodies within the state legislative setting. At the other extreme, for our sample of citizen legislatures, we selected the four least professional states on Squire's measurement (Wyoming, North Dakota, Utah, and South Dakota).ⁱⁱⁱ

The data for this study were collected as part of a nationwide survey of state legislators (House members only) conducted in late 1991. In November of 1991, a four-page questionnaire was sent to over 4,600 legislators in 49 states (New Hampshire excluded due to its

TABLE 1. Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Antecedent Variables in Reduced Model on Formal Position, Staff Size, Bill Activity, and Casework Emphasis (Professional Legislatures)
(standardized regression coefficients)

Antecedent Variables	Endogenous Variables			Casework Emphasis			
	Formal Pos. Direct	Staff Size Direct	Staff Size Indirect	Total ^a	Bill Activity Direct	Bill Activity Indirect	Total ^a
Education	-.08	.04	—	.00	.10 ^b	—	-.15*
Race (White)	-.18**	.26***	-.03	.23	.16*	.05	-.01
Gender (Male)	-.12*	.02	-.02	-.02	-.04	.01	-.04
Seniority	.47***	.38***	.08	.46	.20***	.10	.07
Majority Party	-.02	.26***	—	.26	.23***	.05	.03
Legislative Networking	.07	.07	—	.00	.11*	—	.07
Organized Groups	.01	-.06	—	.00	.12*	—	-.03
District (Urban)	.01	.02	—	.00	.15*	—	-.01
Perception of Casework	-.05	.01	—	.00	.00	—	-.02
Formal Position	—	.16*	—	.16	-.02	.03	-.03
Staff Size	—	—	—	—	.21**	—	-.03
Bill Activity	—	—	—	—	—	—	-.12*
Adjusted R ²	.30	.34	.34	.28	.29	.29	.29

^aTotal effects equal direct plus indirect effects only in cases where direct effects are considered substantive ($p \leq .10$).
Note: $n=193$ $b=p \leq .10$ * $p \leq .05$ ** $p \leq .01$ *** $p \leq .001$

TABLE 2. Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Antecedent Variables in Reduced Model on Formal Position, Staff Size, Bill Activity, and Casework Emphasis (Citizen Legislatures) (standardized regression coefficients)

Antecedent Variables	Endogenous Variables											
	Formal Pos.			Staff Size			Bill Activity			Casework Emphasis		
	Direct	Indirect	Total ^a	Direct	Indirect	Total ^a	Direct	Indirect	Total ^a	Direct	Indirect	Total ^a
Education	.09	-.05	.00	.11*	—	.11	.10 ^b	-.01	.09	-.13*	—	-.13*
Gender (Male)	.04	-.02	.00	.02	—	.00	.14*	—	.14	—	—	—
Political Ambition	.19***	.03	.04	.02	.06	.06	-.04	.00	.00	.08	.01	.01
Seniority	.52***	-.04	.11	.30***	.05	.35	.08	.01	.01	.00	.00	.00
Majority Party	.20***	-.08	.04	.04	.02	.02	.00	.00	.00	-.05	-.01	-.01
Legislative Networking	.03	.06	—	.11*	—	.11	.13*	-.02	.11	-.13*	-.02	-.02
Parliamentary Expertise	.09	-.06	—	.13*	—	.13	.07	-.02	.07	.46***	—	.46
Organized Groups	.02	-.03	—	.16**	—	.16	.11*	-.01	.11	.00	.01	.01
District (Urban)	.16**	.12*	.04	.11*	.02	.13	.46***	—	.46	.00	.01	.01
Perception of Casework	.09	.00	—	.10 ^b	—	.10	.11*	—	.11	-.13*	—	-.13*
Formal Position	—	-.22**	—	.06	—	.06	.00	—	.00	.00	.01	.01
Staff Size	—	—	—	.04	—	.04	.00	—	.00	—	—	—
Bill Activity	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Adjusted R2	.38			.07			.24			.29		

^aTotal effects equal direct plus indirect effects only in cases where direct effects are considered substantive ($p \leq .10$).

Note: n=217 b-p $\leq .10$ * $p \leq .05$ ** $p \leq .01$ *** $p \leq .001$


In the professional model (see Table 1), the remaining antecedent variables explain 30 percent of the variation in formal position ($p \leq .001$), 34 percent of the variation in staff size ($p \leq .001$), 28 percent of the variation in bill activity ($p \leq .001$), and nearly 30 percent of the variation in casework emphasis ($p \leq .001$). In the citizen model (see Table 2), nearly 40 percent of the variation in formal position ($p \leq .001$) is explained by the remaining antecedent variables; only 7 percent of the variance staff size (which is to be expected since staff size is not a major factor in citizen legislatures—80 percent have no staffers, see Appendix), 24 percent the variation in bill activity ($p \leq .001$), and approximately 30 percent of the variation in casework emphasis ($p \leq .001$).

ANALYSIS OF THE MODELS

Before analyzing the path models, we provide a brief descriptive analysis of the two samples--professional and citizen legislatures. (1) As expected, members of professional legislatures have higher levels of education. (2) As expected, professional legislatures have more minorities. (3) Females constituted nearly a quarter of each sample, slightly more than the national average from each type. (4) Members of professional legislatures were much more likely to aspire to higher office than members of citizen legislatures (76 percent versus 47 percent, respectively). (5) Seniority levels are higher in the professional legislatures, as expected. (6) Samples from both types contained a good distribution of majority and minority status political party members. (7) As expected, representatives from citizen legislatures were more likely to engage in networking. (8) The two samples displayed only minimal differences in parliamentary expertise. (9) As hypothesized, representatives from professional legislatures reported more organized group activity in their districts than representatives from citizen legislatures. (10) Members from professional legislatures were more likely to represent wealthy districts. (11) Both types of legislatures have about the same percentage of safe districts (approximately 80 percent each). (12) The professional legislatures were comprised of a much higher percentage of urban and suburban representatives than representatives from citizen legislatures, while citizen representatives were more likely to hail from rural districts. (13) The samples from professional legislatures report that casework activity is much more important to their constituents (68 percent rated it as the most important activity to constituents compared to citizen legislatures where only 26 percent rated casework as the most important activity to constituents). (14) On average, members of professional legislatures served on a greater number of important committees and served in more leadership positions than members of citizen legislatures. (15) As anticipated, representatives from professional legislatures were assigned a greater number of staffers than representatives serving in citizen legislatures (nearly 80 percent in citizen legislatures reported having no staff assigned to them). (16) Members from the professional legislature sample submitted over twice as many bills as those from citizen legislatures. (17) Finally, respondents from the professional legislature sample were much more inclined to rank casework as their most time consuming activity (44 percent) than those from the citizen legislature sample (7 percent). All in all, the members comprising our professional and citizen legislative samples appeared to be highly representative of members from professional and citizen legislatures throughout the United States.

Professional Legislatures: In evaluating the fully trimmed path model for professional legislatures (see Figure 2 below), we find that formal position is primarily a function of seniority (Beta=.47). Race (nonwhite) and gender (female) affect formal position as well, although not to the extent of seniority.

FIGURE 2. Path Diagram of Casework Emphasis In Professional State Legislatures
 (Note: Double-headed arrows reflect correlations among exogenous variables and should not be interpreted as causal arrows.)



Staff size is heavily influenced by seniority, both directly (Beta=.38), and indirectly (via formal position, Beta=.08), yielding a sizable total effect of Beta=.46. And, as expected, staff size is also impacted by race (white), majority party, and formal position.


In terms of direct influence, bill activity is highest among senior, white legislators, who are members of the majority party, who network, enjoy staff support, and represent predominately urban districts marked by interest groups that are well organized. Moreover, race (white), seniority, and majority party exercise indirect effects through formal position and staff

size. Overall, seniority, majority party status, race (white), and staff size are the keys to bill activity in professional legislatures.

Casework emphasis is most strongly affected by perception of constituents' attitudes toward casework (Beta=.41). In other words, legislators who feel constituent pressure (real or imagined) to perform casework are far more likely to emphasize this activity than those who do not feel this pressure. We also found casework to be more vigorously pursued by less formally educated members, those from rural districts, representatives low in bill activity, and those with smaller staffs (forcing legislators to perform casework themselves as opposed to delegating to staff personnel). Examining the indirect and total effects upon casework in this model, we observe that seniority (lack of it) and minority party status contribute to higher levels of casework activity, as hypothesized.

Citizen Legislatures: In evaluating the fully trimmed path model for citizen legislatures (see Figure 3 below), we find that formal position is primarily a function of seniority (as was the case with the professional model). However, unlike the professional legislatures, positions of leadership are also strongly influenced by majority party status, ambition for higher office, and representing an urban district. Interestingly, within citizen legislatures, there was a strong relationship between political ambition, on the one hand, and district type and seniority on the other. Specifically, ambitious House members tended to be junior members representing urban districts.

FIGURE 3. Path Diagram of Casework Emphasis In Citizen State Legislatures
 (Note: Double-headed arrows reflect correlations among exogenous variables and should not be interpreted as causal arrows.)



Staff size in citizen legislatures is primarily a product of formal position (Beta=.22), and to a lesser extent, rural representation (Beta=-.12). Staff size is not a critical component in the citizen model, as we would anticipate, given the dearth of staffers in such legislatures.

The most powerful causal factor regarding bill activity in citizen legislatures is seniority (Beta=.30, direct; Beta=.35, total). Its impact on a legislators' bill activity is over twice that of the next most powerful factor--the presence of organized groups in members' districts (Beta=.16). To a lesser extent, bill activity levels are also positively influenced by parliamentary expertise (Beta=.13), serving an urban district (Beta=.13), legislative networking (Beta=.11), higher educational levels (Beta=.11), and holding a formal leader position (Beta=.10).

Finally, casework emphasis in citizen legislatures is almost entirely driven by a member's perception of their constituents' attitudes toward casework (Beta=.46). If constituents believe

casework is important, legislators will devote a considerable amount of time to it. Although small in relation to constituents' attitudes toward casework, other significant direct effects on the dependent variable were male gender (Beta=.13), low bill activity (Beta=-.13), parliamentary expertise (Beta=.13), representing a rural district (Beta=-.11), staff assistance (Beta=-.11), and being less formally educated (Beta=-.10). Indirect effects are minimal in the application of this model due to the lack of strong mediating links among endogenous variables.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Members of professional legislatures are better educated and more personally ambitious, and their districts contain more organized interests who pay attention to what they do in the legislature. The professional legislatures process a much larger volume of bills and spend more time on casework. Majority party status does not directly impact on formal position, but formal position is itself influenced by seniority, minority race, and being female. Seniority and minority race are also correlated with majority party status. Apparently, minority race members and females bloc/bargain to acquire formal leadership positions with the more senior members within the majority party. Subsequently, these groups possess and utilize staffers via their formal positions; however, the greater availability of staff to members of professional legislatures permits those possessing of other resources, in addition to majority party status, to obtain staff assistants--namely more senior whites from the majority party.

Bill activity is enhanced primarily by seniority and majority party status--no surprises there. Interestingly, level of bill activity is also determined by race (whites submit more) and staff size (professional legislators tend to use their staff support for bill production, not casework). Networking and representing urban or suburban districts with organized interests also contribute to increased amounts of bill production by House members in professional legislatures. Notably, members of the majority party also tend to be representatives from urban/suburban districts.

Members with less formal education, limited staff resources, and who serve rural districts spend more of their own time on casework. Meanwhile, any members who perceive their constituents as rating casework as important are especially likely to emphasize it themselves (Beta=.41). The strength of this variable in the model is nearly four times more powerful than the second most influential factor. Finally, members of professional legislatures who are more active at bill activities are somewhat less inclined to engage in casework, although it should be recalled that professional legislators process a much larger volume of both bills and casework.

Within the citizen legislative setting, a different array of individual, district, and institutional characteristics are of consequence to formal position, staff size, bill activity, and casework. For example, attaining formal position is facilitated by being a politically ambitious senior member within the majority party who also represents an urban district. Staff assistance, on the other hand, is linked primarily to one's formal position in the chamber because only those with formal position have staff allocated to them in the citizen legislatures. Seniority exercises some indirect influence on staff size vis-a-vis formal position. Representing an urban district also helps in acquiring staff assistance and does so directly as well as indirectly through formal position.

The path analysis results pertaining to bill activity levels in citizen legislatures demonstrated that higher levels are linked to those more highly educated, senior leaders who network and possess parliamentary expertise, and to members representing urban districts which contain better organized groups. Meanwhile, casework emphasis is shown to be linked to well educated males with parliamentary expertise representing rural districts. Additionally, those who

have some staff in the citizen legislatures use them to assist in casework. Especially crucial to the representative's casework emphasis is the legislator's perception of the importance of casework to her/his constituents (Beta=.46). The strength of this variable in the model is three times more powerful than the second most influential factor. Finally, members higher on bill activities were somewhat lower on casework activities, although the volume of both bill and casework activities is lower in the citizen legislatures.

CONCLUSIONS

The legislatures examined in this study--professional and citizen--display five major similarities: (1) the overwhelming importance of seniority for acquiring formal leadership positions, and to a lesser extent, higher levels of bill activity; (2) the overwhelming importance of members' perceptions of their constituents' preferences for casework on casework emphasis; (3) legislators more active in bill-making tend to be less active in casework; (4) representatives serving urban interests tend to place greater emphasis on lawmaking, while legislators from rural districts tend to focus more on casework; and (5) the presence of organized groups in one's district tends to incite greater levels of bill activity of behalf of the representative as opposed to increased efforts on casework.

Several major differences between the two types of legislatures were also observed: (1) race played a much larger role in the professional model than in the citizen model; (2) majority party status was more important in the professional model; and (3) in professional legislatures where staff support is greater, staff is more likely to be used for assistance in bill preparation, not casework; while in citizen legislatures, where staff support is extremely limited, it tends to be utilized in more of a casework capacity.

The two approaches to organizing state legislatures--professional and citizen--reflect the needs and interests of citizens in differing circumstances. The professional legislatures are structural accommodations to more densely populated and heterogeneous districts. Professionalizing a legislature may be the only means by which to process the much larger volume of competing demands from such settings. Such formal institutions are realistic accommodations to the tough and tumble of negotiations and coalition building among numerous and competing interests.

On the other hand, in more homogenous situations of lesser population density i.e., citizen legislatures), fewer competing interests develop. With shared values/preferences, decision making is more consensual. Political parties and small staffs are used primarily to organize the formal leadership for nonpartisan institutional needs. Communication of demands/requests is conducted more directly between the legislator and her/his constituents (Dunn and Whistler 1986, 101-108). The members of citizen legislatures view their roles as conduits of the preferences of their constituents, and whether they agree with those preferences or not, citizen legislators proceed to process most constituent demands/requests.

Despite the structural and organizational differences between the two type of state legislatures presented in this article, one inescapable conclusion emerges: Regardless of legislative setting, the most powerful predictor of time spent on casework is personal perception and attitude. Legislators who believe constituency service is important to their constituents will expend more time and effort in performing those activities than legislators who do not share that attitude. This finding confirms Jewell and Patterson's (1986, 75) belief that "probably the most important reason for variations in the amount of casework is the attitude of legislators themselves." Finally, in the polar extremes of professional and citizen state legislatures,

members who engage in more bill-passage activities tend to engage in somewhat less casework activities.

This research is significant for both practitioners and academics because it provides evidence that American state legislators not only listen to their constituents, but also provide the representational activities/services that legislators perceive their constituents want.

APPENDIX

	<u>Professional</u> (n=193)	<u>Citizen</u> (n=217)
Education	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Percent</u>
1=high school (or less)	3	10
2=some college	18	24
3=bachelor's degree	22	25
4=master's degree/some graduate	32	29
5=professional degree	<u>25</u>	<u>12</u>
	100%	100%
Race	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Percent</u>
0=nonwhite	7	3
1=white	<u>93</u>	<u>97</u>
	100%	100%
Gender	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Percent</u>
0=female	22	23
1=male	<u>78</u>	<u>77</u>
	100%	100%
Ambition (for higher office)	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Percent</u>
0=no	24	53
1=yes/maybe	<u>76</u>	<u>47</u>
	100%	100%
Seniority (number of years in House chamber)	Mn= 8.5 Md= 9	Mn=6.3 Md=5
Party	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Percent</u>
0=minority	42	41
1=majority	<u>58</u>	<u>59</u>
	100%	100%
Legislative Networking (number of informal/after hours meetings with other legislators to work out positions on bills, per week)	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Percent</u>
0=0 meetings	33	12
1=1-2 meetings	49	56
2=3-4 meetings	14	22
3=5 or more meetings	<u>4</u>	<u>10</u>
	100%	100%

Parliamentary Expertise (5-point scale)	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Percent</u>
1=I know enough to get by	2	3
2	11	10
3	41	38
4	40	43
5=parliamentary expert	<u>6</u>	<u>5</u>
	100%	100%

Groups in District	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Percent</u>
1=not organized	4	3
2=somewhat organized	41	69
3=well organized	43	32
4=very well organized	<u>12</u>	<u>6</u>
	100%	100%

Income of District	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Percent</u>
1=very poor	2	2
2=poor	18	21
3=moderate	54	67
4=wealthy	24	9
5=very wealthy	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>
	100%	100%

District Competition	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Percent</u>
0=unsafe district (margin of victory in primary and/or general elections \leq 5%)	16	22
1=safe district (margin of victory in primary and/or general elections $>$ 5%)	<u>84</u>	<u>78</u>
	100%	100%

District	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Percent</u>
0=rural	24	47
1=nonrural (suburban/urban)	<u>76</u>	<u>53</u>
	100%	100%

Legislators' Perceptions of Importance of Casework to Constituents (4-point scale)

	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Percent</u>
1=least imp. legislative activity	5	12
2	8	28
3	19	34
4=most imp. legislative activity	<u>68</u>	<u>26</u>
	100%	100%
	Mn=3.5	Mn=2.7

Formal Position (members were assigned points according to the following index: 0 pts if member only; 1 pt if committee vice chair; 2 pts if serve as committee vice chair on two or more committees; 3 pts if committee chair; 4 pts if serve as if serve as committee chair and committee vice chair ; 5 pts if serve as committee chair on two or more committees; and 6 pts if party leader or whip. Moreover, legislators who were members of "key committees" were awarded one point for each membership. Key committees were identified as House tax and budget committees.

Staff Size (full-time only)	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Percent</u>
0=no full-time staff members assigned	2	79
1=1-2 staff members	68	14
2=3-4 staff members	16	5
3=5 or more staff members	<u>15</u>	<u>2</u>
	101%	100%

Bill Activity

Number of state and local bills sponsored by representative (or was primary co-sponsor)
Does not include committee-sponsored bills.

<u>Professional</u>	<u>Citizen</u>
(n=193)	(n=217)
Mn=27	Mn=11
Mn=17	Mn=8
Max=152	Max=80

Casework Emphasis(4-point scale)	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Percent</u>
1=least time consuming activity	6	6
2	15	39
3	35	48
4=most time consuming activity	<u>44</u>	<u>7</u>
	100%	100%
	Mn=3.2	Mn=2.6

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NOTES

ⁱ Compare Rosenthal (1998, 16) with Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson (1962, 304).

ⁱⁱ Both Cavanagh and Johannes data were from the quintessential American professional legislature, the U.S. Congress.

ⁱⁱⁱ New Hampshire is rated the least professional of all the state legislatures according to Squire's index. However, New Hampshire was not surveyed due to the disproportionate size of its House chamber (n=400) which is twice as large as the second largest House chamber in the fifty states and ten times that of the smallest House chamber.

^{iv} Wayne Francis reported a 52 percent return rate (*Legislative Issues in the Fifty States*. Chicago, IL: Rand McNally, 1967, 108). Sue Thomas had a 54 percent response rate in her survey of 12 state legislatures (*How Women Legislate*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, 43). Eric Uslander and Ronald Weber reported a 38 percent rate of return (*Patterns of Decision Making in State Legislatures*. New York: Praeger, 1977, 4). Edith Barrett reported a 44 percent return rate in her study focusing on black state legislators ("The Policy Priorities of African American Women in State Legislatures." *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 20, May 1995, 226). James Button and David Hedge obtained a 40 percent response rate from a national survey of black state legislators and 34 percent from a random sample of white state legislators ("Legislative Life in the 1990s: A Comparison of Black and White State Legislators." *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 21, May 1996, 202). Lynne E. Ford and Kathleen Dolan had a 46 percent return rate from their survey of southern and non-southern women state legislators ("The Politics of Women State Legislators: A South/Non-South Comparison." *Southeastern Political Review*, 23, June 1995, 339).

^v Path coefficients are standardized regression coefficients that reflect the average change in standard deviation of an effect (endogenous variable) associated with a change of one standard deviation in a cause (exogenous variable or preceding endogenous variable), when all other causes of that effect are held constant. Path coefficients also allow a comparison of the relative magnitudes of the various coefficients within the same model (see Asher 1983, 45-47).

^{vi} Autocorrelation and the problems it presents are more likely to appear with time-series data than with the cross-sectional data used in this study (see Lewis-Beck 1980, 28).