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**“Political Culture, Political Attitudes, and Aggregated Demographic Affects:
Regionalism and Political Ideology in Arkansas”**

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Abstract

This analysis investigates further the notion of political culture among distinct geographic regions in the State of Arkansas. In addition to identifying attitudinal differences among regions, our work tests competing explanations of why such variations exist. Is it the influence of long-standing regional-level effects (i.e., "political culture") or are the political differences among Arkansas's regions a product of the individual characteristics of people who simply share the same space? We combine contextual data with results of a statewide poll to address these questions. Though the relationships are weak, our findings recommend the individual-level model of explanation rather than the regional, or "cultural," one. We conclude that political culture is best understood as the aggregation of shared demographic characteristics of a region's residents, which are, in turn, shaped by past social, economic, and political forces.

INTRODUCTION

The notion of politically and culturally distinct intrastate regions has long been a subject of interest in subnational political science research. The State of Arkansas has been the target of several such investigations, and the concept yet plays a very integral role in its politics.^{vi} Specifically, a sense that there are certain characteristics that differentiate West from East, North from South, and – most particularly – Ozark from Delta is pervasive in the state's academic and popular rhetoric. It is interesting that much of the conversation about the state's regional variations centers upon *explanation* as much as *characterization*. The small town charms and the concentrated poverty said to distinguish Southeastern Arkansas, for example, are widely explained as remnants of its cotton plantation legacy, and thus its connection to the “Old South” both economically and culturally. Popular characterizations of Northwestern Arkansas paint a contrasting picture of a frontier land which long bordered “Indian Territory,” and is distinguished by its individualistic mentality and raw, rugged flavor. The latter area's booming industry and haughty isolation from its sister regions are likewise attributed to those much-chronicled early roots.

More interesting still, from a political science perspective, is the tendency of Arkansans to explain the political differences that yet remain between Delta and Ozark by relying upon these distinctive historical legacies. There is perhaps no better illustration of this phenomenon than the widely reported divergent party preferences of the two regions. Since the New Deal, conventional wisdom waxes, Democrats have held the day in the counties bordering the Mississippi River and its westward stretching plains

out of grateful loyalty for poverty-quelling government programs. For their support, Republicans – who planted their roots in the state’s anti-slavery forested uplands during the Civil War – have been able to court only the northern and Western mountainous regions. Contemporary voter turnout rates are likewise said to be reflective of the state’s two distinctive cultural traditions. Participation rates in Eastern and Southern Arkansas remain precipitously low (relative even to other southern states), partly in deference to a still resonant plantation, *noblesse oblige* mentality. Voting rates in the West and Northwest corner, in contrast, are often competitive with national averages reflecting, perhaps, the rugged individualism of bygone days.^{vi}

The scholarship which address these matters has indeed generated a good deal of evidence that describes and delineates the state’s political divides, especially between the Northwest and the Southeast.^{vi} The causes of the phenomenon, however, remain something of a puzzle. Are contemporary differences in political preferences between “Ozark” and “Delta” chiefly a product of their distinctive historical legacies? Or, does the real answer lie in factors much less sublime such as the differences in the demographic composition of two areas?

These are questions of course with which political science has grappled for some time, most expressly among scholars working with the concept of “political culture.” Defined by Elazar in 1966 as “the particular pattern of orientation to political action in which each political system is imbedded,”^{vi} the notion traditionally has been more heavily tied to historical research than most social scientists would prefer. Measured and tested in various ways since Elazar’s entrepreneurial work, the concept has been demonstrated to have some utility in predicting the policy choices, institutional character, and other politically-relevant phenomena among the American states.^{vi} What scholars have not figured out, however, is the degree to which such differences genuinely are the product of distinctive collective cultural legacies and not simply a matter of the preferences and actions of the individuals who happen to live in a common space.

Although resolving this conflict is far beyond the reach of this paper, we do aim to shed a little more light on the characteristics and causes of political regionalism within Arkansas. We proceed in this way: First, by using county-level social and economic data, we attempt to characterize distinct regions within the state. Second, we test the significance of these regions for individual political preferences in the form of a “conservatism index” crafted from recent survey data.^{vi} Third, we attempt to determine whether it is the distinctiveness of these regions that affects the political attitudes of their residents, or whether it is instead the case that such attitudes are more properly linked to the demographic characteristics of the individuals who live there.

REGIONALISM IN ARKANSAS POLITICS: THE LITERATURE

As noted above, there have been a number of studies in the Arkansas politics literature that have confirmed the presence of a political divide between Northwest and Southeast Arkansas. Savage and Gallagher (1977) for example, revealed three regions: one on either side of an imaginary diagonal line running from Texarkana to Jonesboro (confirming much of the prevailing wisdom in the state). The counties of Northwestern

Arkansas generally demonstrated higher citizen participation rates in election races, and populations that were older and more highly educated than found in other parts of the state. Citizens of this "Ozark" region also were more likely than those in other regions to support Republicans in state and national elections. The counties to the East and South, in contrast, contained younger and less educated residents who, as might be expected, were less likely to register and to vote, though when they did it was for Democratic candidates. Residents of these "Delta" counties also were more impoverished than their northwestern neighbors. According to Savage and Gallagher, the final, "Urban," region revealed by their analysis was more difficult to characterize. Much smaller in number (only five of the state's 75 counties fell into this category), Arkansas's urban counties showed some propensity toward lower birth rates, higher levels of educational attainment, a greater proportion of people engaged in managerial-professional occupations, and the like.

Building from the preliminary descriptive findings of Savage and Blair (1984), Blair, Mangold, and Savage (1988) also found considerable evidence for regionalism in Arkansas politics. Broadly speaking, the primary observation they provide is that while there are great similarities within the Arkansas electorate, attitudinal variations among the geographic regions of the state are indeed detectable and, in some cases, are of considerable magnitude. The residents of the state's Eastern and Southern counties were discovered to be socially conservative on questions of criminal punishment, gender equity, school integration, and abortion; they also were markedly pessimistic about their economic futures. Arkansans of the Western and Northern counties, in contrast, were – for the most part – more cheerful about economic conditions, and also were more inclined, relative to their Delta counterparts, to take a liberal position on social issues such as racial and sexual equality.

The work of the Blair, Mangold, and Savage team is particularly important to this study not only because of the additional evidence they discovered for intrastate variations in public opinion, but because they reached beyond the bounds of the past literature and sought to *explain* the differences they observed. Specifically, after acknowledging the tremendous difficulty of sorting through the respective roles of historical legacy, contemporary contextual conditions, and individual-level demographic differences (especially given their access to aggregate-level data only), the trio managed to hold two theoretically interesting demographic variables constant in their analysis. These were: (1) each region's level of educational attainment; and (2) its proportion of "native" (as opposed to transplanted) Arkansas residents. From these efforts, Blair and her colleagues arrived at the tentative conclusion that regional opinion differences in Arkansas are, at least in part, a product of what they call "compositional effects." Their research suggests that to the degree the political attitudes collectively expressed by one section of a state are distinct from those expressed by another, it is quite likely that in addition to being an outcome of distinctive cultural legacies, such results reflect the individual-level characteristics of people who happen to live in the same space.

EXPLAINING REGIONALISM IN ARKANSAS POLITICS

Again, the goals of this article are threefold: first, to discern the presence of distinctive regions within the state of Arkansas; second, to test the significance of these regions on individual political preferences; and third, to sort through the causes of those variations. To determine first whether distinctive intrastate regions would emerge from data collected in the 1990s as they did in the 1970s and 80s, county-level social and economic variables were collected on each of the state's 75 counties. When Principal Components Analysis was employed on these data three factors emerged (see Table 1), factors strikingly similar to those of Savage and Gallagher (1977). The first component, featured in column 1 of the table, clearly reflects an Ozark-Delta division. Counties receiving a higher score on this component demonstrated slower economic growth than the rest of the state, more pronounced economic impoverishment, a sizable number of African American residents, and steady population decline. Nearly all of the counties, which received a score above the median on this component, were adjacent to the Mississippi River, shared a border with a county adjacent to the Mississippi River, or were located in the extreme southern part of the state^{vi} (see Table 2). A "Delta" region, then, remains clearly identifiable in contemporary Arkansas.

Table 1
Principal Components Analysis of
Arkansas's Region

	Component		
	Delta	Urban	Rural
% Below Poverty 1996	0.902	-0.120	0.308
\$ Per Capita Income Support 1990	0.826	-0.138	0.366
% Black 1990	0.833	0.265	-0.009
% Unemployed 1994	0.779	-0.156	-0.070
% Change in Population 1997-8	-0.759	-0.017	-0.026
Median Income 1996	-0.700	0.498	-0.288
% Workforce in Skilled Trade Occupation 1990	-0.536	-0.536	-0.202
Total County Population 1990	-0.173	0.813	-0.152
% Workforce in Management Occupation 1990	0.043	0.756	-0.342
% Own Homes 1990	-0.462	-0.729	-0.272
Per Capita Income 1993	-0.388	0.716	-0.221
\$ Per Capita Earnings from Agriculture 1990	-0.070	-0.200	0.867
% Workforce Agriculture 1990	0.250	-0.268	0.859
% Of Workforce in Farm Occupation 1990	0.174	-0.333	0.795
% Farmland 1992	0.180	0.258	0.688

The next component revealed by our analysis reflects the "urbanness" of the county. As featured in the second column of Table 1, these counties possess larger

populations, their residents earn higher-than-average incomes, and are more often employed in managerial or professional occupations. At the same time, urban county residents are less likely to own their own homes. The third component suggests the level of a county's dependence upon agriculture in its economy. As featured in Table 1's third column, the residents of these "rural" counties receive more of their per capita income from agricultural production, are more likely to labor in the agricultural industry, and engage in farm-related occupations with great frequency. Likewise, a larger portion of the land in these counties is used for farming.

Table 2
Component Score by County

	<u>Delta</u>	<u>Urban</u>	<u>Rural</u>
Arkansas	-0.445	1.086	1.974
Ashley	0.131	0.010	-0.735
Baxter	-0.637	0.046	-0.958
Benton	-2.047	1.552	0.282
Boone	-0.473	0.531	-0.014
Bradley	0.883	-0.280	-1.421
Calhoun	0.667	-1.081	-1.831
Carroll	-0.960	0.015	0.618
Chicot	2.272	0.219	1.212
Clark	0.499	1.079	-0.793
Cleburne	-0.743	-0.941	-0.548
Cleveland	-0.629	-1.262	-0.676
Columbia	0.960	0.005	-1.309
Conway	-0.205	-0.151	0.276
Craighead	-0.783	1.667	0.489
Crawford	-0.737	-0.463	-0.736
Crittenden	0.899	1.204	0.236
Cross	0.120	0.272	1.468
Dallas	1.121	-0.689	-1.855
Desha	1.372	0.354	1.406
Drew	0.605	0.250	-0.688
Faulkner	-1.119	1.421	-0.654
Franklin	-1.448	-0.777	0.819
Fulton	0.138	-1.218	0.258
Garland	-0.236	1.109	-1.053
Grant	-1.173	-0.655	-1.448
Greene	-0.889	-0.102	0.000
Hempstead	0.349	-0.493	-0.274

Hot Spring	-0.301	-0.565	-1.165
Howard	-0.767	-0.202	0.830
Independence	-0.637	0.045	-0.288
Izard	-0.058	-0.955	-0.214
Jackson	0.891	0.357	0.660
Jefferson	1.207	1.232	-0.975
Johnson	-0.526	-0.456	-0.433
Lafayette	1.554	-0.958	-0.625
Lawrence	0.191	-0.496	0.613
Lee	2.503	0.128	1.678
Lincoln	0.757	-0.366	0.806
Little River	0.253	0.299	-1.481
Logan	-0.571	-0.716	-0.301
Lonoke	-1.524	0.776	0.774
Madison	-1.446	-0.690	2.358
Marion	-0.914	-0.584	0.009
Miller	0.289	0.156	-0.893
Mississippi	1.027	1.073	0.407
Monroe	1.718	0.454	1.453
Montgomery	-0.763	-1.373	0.952
Nevada	0.403	-0.675	-0.356
Newton	0.426	-1.458	-0.339
Ouachita	1.344	-0.117	-1.995
Perry	-0.860	-1.725	0.364
Phillips	2.797	0.814	0.386
Pike	-0.698	-0.672	0.179
Poinsett	0.054	-0.108	1.543
Polk	-0.603	-0.556	0.060
Pope	-0.916	0.647	-0.529
Prairie	-0.412	-0.321	2.530
Pulaski	-0.344	4.753	-0.693
Randolph	-0.148	-0.784	-0.349
Saline	-1.532	0.592	-0.865
Scott	-0.151	-0.542	-0.061
Searcy	0.524	-1.242	0.760
Sebastian	-0.869	1.081	-0.266
Sevier	-0.398	0.126	-0.526
Sharp	-0.383	-1.308	-0.014
St. Francis	2.064	0.359	0.126
Stone	0.128	-0.536	0.507

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Union	0.266	0.639	-1.543
Van Buren	0.448	-0.900	-0.821
Washington	-1.190	2.471	0.395
White	-0.666	0.230	-0.301
Woodruff	1.307	0.361	1.512
Yell	-0.683	-0.534	0.533

Having established that there are still identifiable regions into which Arkansas counties may be rather easily sorted (and that they are very similar to those uncovered in past research), we can now turn our attention to our second task: identifying a relationship between the aggregate character of each region and the political attitudes of the individual respondents residing within them. To do so, we created an index – a new variable – that reflects the relative “conservativeness” of each respondent in our survey sample. The index itself is a simple additive scale of seven dichotomous variables. The dichotomous variables were generated from the responses to ideological-type poll questions on matters such as taxes, abortion, flag burning, and gun control (see Figure 1). Conservative responses on each question were coded “1,” liberal or moderate responses were coded “0,” and the values were then summed. Respondents with a Conservative Index score of “7” thus were clearly identifiable as very conservative whereas those who received a “0” for their index score were not at all conservative. Table 3 displays a frequency distribution for the Conservatism Index.

Figure 1
Conservatism Index

1. Property taxes in Arkansas are too high. (Agree=1; Disagree=0)
2. Property taxes in Arkansas should be: Increased (0), Kept the same (0), Reduced (1), or Abolished (1)?
3. Would you say you favor stricter gun control (0), or less strict gun control (1)? (No Change=0)
4. Do you favor laws that would make it MORE DIFFICULT for a woman to get an abortion (1), favor laws that would make it EASIER to get an abortion (0) or should NO CHANGE be made to existing abortion laws (0)?
5. And, do you favor or oppose passing a Constitutional Amendment which makes it illegal to burn the American flag? (Yes=1; No=0)
6. Do you approve (1) or disapprove (0) of taking the state sales tax off of food purchased at a grocery store?
7. And, how do you feel about legalizing casino gambling here in Arkansas? That is, do you favor (0) or oppose (1) legalizing casino gambling in our state? Or haven't you thought much about this matter?

Table 3

Conservatism Index Frequency Distributions

		Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Least Conservative	0	7	.9	.9
	1	29	3.5	4.4
	2	78	9.5	14.0
	3	120	14.7	28.6
	4	226	27.7	56.3
	5	187	22.9	79.2
	6	138	16.9	96.1
Most Conservative	7	32	3.9	100.0
	Total	817	100.0	

To determine whether an individual's political attitudes (i.e., degree of conservatism) were related to the characteristics of his or her region of residence, the conservatism variable was correlated with the county component scores, now transformed into three, separate variables: the Delta component score, the Urban component score, and the Rural component score. As Table 4 suggests, there appears to be little relationship between the individual-level conservatism scores and the county-level characteristics. Specifically, although the correlation coefficient is statistically significant for the "Urban" scores and individual Conservatism Index scores, the relationship is very weak, accounting for less than one percent of the variance. This suggests that a respondent's region has little to do with his or her political ideology. If a person is from a Delta county, he or she may indeed hold different political views than someone from the Ozarks; these differences, however, cannot be attributed to their respective geographic locales. Another look at the remaining relationships tested in Table 4 indicate that the same conclusion holds true for counties of the Urban and Rural varieties.

Table 4
 Pearson's Correlation Coefficients
 Regional Components Scores and Conservatism Index

Conservatism Index	Delta Factor	Urban Factor	Rural Factor
Pearson Correlation	-0.042	-0.094	-0.01
Sig. (2-tailed)	0.228	0.007	0.769
N	817	817	817

It would appear that our findings so far contradict a good deal of prevailing wisdom, a collective "sense" among Arkansas citizens and among most of the community of scholars studying political culture in the state that cultural differences contribute much toward explaining the divergent political perspectives of East and West. Even more, the finding is counter-intuitive in that it defies what we know (and can point to empirically) about vote choice in Arkansas over the past 50 years. Residents of the Delta always have voted more fervently Democratic than the rest of the state, and residents of the Ozarks have long been a Republican candidate's best hope of support (Blair, 1988). How can it be that our data reveal little difference between the ideological preferences of the two regions' residents? Herein lies our most puzzling question still.

It seems that there are two possible explanations. First, what if the relationship does not materialize because Arkansans are ideologically uniform? It was V. O. Key who proposed, "Arkansas exhibits a case of political consensus in exaggerated form" (Key, 1949, p. 185). We have not, after all, tested respondents' party identification against the regionalism concept; Democrat or Republican, perhaps all Arkansans are conservative? We are confident that this is not the case. Though they are not illustrated here, there were wide differences on many of the policy questions included in our survey. Gun control and abortion were particularly divisive within the sample. A quick return to the results of Table 3, in fact, illustrates this point. Though the distribution of the conservatism index leans a little to the right, it is a respectable curve with substantial variance. In other words, Arkansans varied significantly in their responses to the ideological indicators we asked them.

That said, we hypothesized that the answer could very well lie in the demographic characteristics of the individuals who reside in the distinctive regions of the state. To test

this idea, we regressed regional component scores for each county, along with individual level demographic data, onto respondents' scores on the conservatism index variable. The results for the first regional factor, the Delta factor, are displayed in Table 5. Although the model itself holds no great predictive power and the relationships revealed are weak, if we look at the specific variables within the equation, some insight into the dynamics of regional political culture is revealed. Specifically, the race and education variables were significant, while the Delta factor's score was not. This means that respondents' race and education are better predictors of their political attitudes than is region. Stated more broadly, people who share similar racial characteristics and attain like levels of education will have similar political attitudes, a fact which obscures any potential regional influence. African-Americans and the better educated, for example, tend to hold more liberal ideological orientations, while less-educated whites tend to be more conservative. The results for the equations in which the "urban" and "rural" regions were tested were likewise disappointing for proponents of culture as an independent variable in political science research (see Tables 6 and 7). At least within Arkansas, then, knowing the region from which a respondent hails is of very little predictive utility for political attitudes when individual-level demographic information is included in the analysis.

Table 5

Delta Component Regression Analysis of Political, Socioeconomic, and Demographic Variables

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	4.507	0.302		14.935	0.000
Age	0.000	0.003	0.003	0.080	0.937
Sex	-0.034	0.112	-0.011	-0.302	0.763
Income	-0.001	0.033	-0.001	-0.019	0.985
Race	0.422	0.151	0.109	2.794	0.005
Education	-0.151	0.044	-0.143	-3.442	0.001
Delta Factor	-0.011	0.061	-0.007	-0.175	0.861

R=.175
R Square=.031
Adj. R Square=.022

Table 6
Urban Component Regression Analysis of Political, Socioeconomic,
and Demographic Variables

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	4.570	0.303		15.068	0.000
Age	0.000	0.003	-0.001	-0.035	0.972
Sex	-0.044	0.111	-0.015	-0.393	0.694
Income	0.002	0.033	0.002	0.049	0.961
Race	0.392	0.149	0.102	2.633	0.009
Education	-0.141	0.044	-0.133	-3.177	0.002
Urban Factor	-0.054	0.034	-0.062	-1.613	0.107

R=.185

R Square=.031

Adj. R Square=.026

Table 7
Rural Component Regression Analysis of Political, Socioeconomic,
and Demographic Variables

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	4.482	0.303		14.808	0.000
Age	0.000	0.003	0.003	0.066	0.947
Sex	-0.032	0.111	-0.011	-0.286	0.775
Income	0.000	0.033	-0.001	-0.014	0.989
Race	0.444	0.149	0.115	2.986	0.003
Education.	-0.152	0.044	-0.143	-3.454	0.001
Rural Factor	-0.065	0.069	-0.035	-0.948	0.344

R=.178

R Square=.032

Adj. R Square=.024

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The investigation of regionalism within Arkansas is a line of research with a rich history. It has firmly established that the long-perceived intrastate regions – particularly the Ozark-Delta split – are very real, in that they connote not only different historical legacies, but also divergent contemporary realities. Despite increasing in- and out-migration in the state in the 1980s and 1990s, our findings support this distinctive regional identities thesis. Past research also has confirmed that these regions demonstrate some degree of meaningful political differences. But are such differences a product of regional culture?

Our polling data, at least as compressed into the single “conservatism index” featured here and tested as a simple correlate with the Delta, Urban, and Rural regions suggest that regional political differences in Arkansas may be a product of the ecological fallacy when inferred onto individual residents. That is, using county-level election outcomes as the dependent variable in regional explorations obscures the individual-level preferences that can be revealed by survey data. To this end, one more step in the investigation proved revealing. Switching to regression analysis and using the individual conservatism index as our dependent variable, we were able to probe not just the presence, but also the cause of the geographically-based distinctiveness in our sample. Although further analysis will be required to better support the findings presented here, it appears that the source of the ideological distinctiveness of Arkansas’s regions is not so much a matter of regional circumstance, as it is an issue of each region’s ethnic and educational composition.

This raises an interesting question, one which has both a “temporal” and a “level of analysis” quality, and which has long been troublesome to scholars working with the political culture concept. If culture is measured in a traditional, Elazarian fashion, much of it is historical in nature: which people settled where, and when; what were the expectations – especially of elites^{vi} – of economic, social, and political institutions; and in what ways were leaders and citizens constrained in their preferences and choices? These historical developments, some from decades and some from centuries ago, manifest themselves today largely as demographic facts. The Delta region of Arkansas, for example, is poor, under-educated, and black as a direct consequence of the plantation economy that operated there from the 1800s until (including the sharecropping system) the 1940s. Regional culture, then, manifests itself in demographics, and demographics – as we have demonstrated here – help explain the attitudes and behaviors that most interest political science. We are compelled to conclude, then, that for social scientists who seek to study contemporary attitudes and behaviors, regional culture is somewhat suspect as an autonomous concept, an independent variable with predictive powers in its own right. Instead culture tempers and shapes the characteristics of the contemporary characteristics of the individual people who happen to share the same space.

^{vi} **AUTHORS' NOTE:** A previous draft of this paper was delivered at the annual meeting of the Arkansas Political Association, Little Rock, Arkansas, February 18-19, 2000. The authors would like to thank the conference participants for their many insightful comments. We also wish to acknowledge Collis Geren, Will Miller, Todd Shields, Susan Thomas, and Molly Longstreth for their assistance in the data collection and manuscript preparation phases of this research.

^{vii} For the latest voter turnout statistics in Arkansas by county, see the Secretary of State's website at <http://sos.state.ar.us/vc98>.

^{viii} See for example Richard Yates, "Arkansas: Independent and Unpredictable," *The Changing Politics of the South*, William C. Havard, ed. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1972); Robert L. Savage and Richard J. Gallagher, "Politico-cultural Regions in a Southern State: An Empirical Analysis," *Publius* 7(Winter, 1977):91-105; Robert L. Savage and Diane D. Blair, "Regionalism and Political Opinion in Arkansas: An Exploratory Survey," *Arkansas Political Science Journal* (1984):59-85; Diane D. Blair, William D. Mangold, and Robert L. Savage, "Further Explorations of Regionalism and Political Opinion in Arkansas," *Midsouth Political Science Journal* (1988):92-109; Diane D. Blair, *Arkansas Politics and Government: Do the People Rule?* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1988).

^{ix} Daniel J. Elazar, *American Federalism: A View From the States* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1966), p. 84.

^x See for example Ira Sharkansky, "The Utility of Elazar's Political Culture: A Research Note," *Polity* (1969):66-83; Joel Lieske, "Regional Subcultures in the United States," *Journal of Politics*, (1993):888-913; Robert Erikson, John P. McIver, and Gerald C. Wright, "State Political Culture and Public Opinion," *American Political Science Review* (1987):797-813; Thomas J. Volgy, John E. Schwarz, and Hildy Gottlieb, "Female Representation and the Quest for Resources: Feminist Activism and Electoral Success," *Social Science Quarterly* (1986):156-168; David Young Miller, "The Impact of Political Culture on Patterns of State and Local Government Expenditures," *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* (1991):83-100; Keith Boeckelman, "Political Culture and State Development Policy," *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* (1991):49-62; and Joel Paddock, "Research Note: Political Culture and the Partisan Style of State Party Activists," *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* (1997):127-132.

^{xi} Between September 15th and October 2nd of 1999, the Survey Research Center at the University of Arkansas, Fayetteville dialed 3,738 randomly selected Arkansas telephone numbers. These attempts yielded 885 completed surveys. The remainder of the surveys were not completed due to the resident's absence, a refusal to participate, a busy line, a "no longer in service" message, or the resident being under the age of 18 years. Employing guidelines established by the American Association for Public Opinion Research, we calculated the poll's cooperation rate to be 70.6%. This figure reflects completed surveys as a percentage of all eligible individuals contacted. A complete survey consisted of 68 questions. The text of the survey protocol is available on-line at <http://plsc.uark.edu/arkpoll>.

^{xii} Five counties in the Ozarks also received component scores above the mean: Fulton, Newton, Searcy, Stone, and Van Buren.

^{xiii} For an interesting discussion of the use of Elazar's ideas in public opinion research see, Robert L. Savage, "Looking for Political Subcultures: A Critique of the Rummage-Sale Approach," *The Western Political Quarterly*, 34:331-336.

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