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American Political Parties, Political Culture, & Presidential Elections: 1972-2000

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ABSTRACT

The focus of this empirical analysis is determining whether or not political culture affects electoral outcomes in presidential elections in the United States. Using Professor Elazar's classic typology of the three political subcultures, it is ascertained that in elections over the last thirty years, Republicans generally attract their highest support in the traditionalistic states; Democrats typically fare best in the individualistic states; the results in the moralistic states are of a mixed nature. Third party candidates such as John Anderson, Ross Perot, and Ralph Nader usually attract more popular support in the moralistic states and render their lowest level of proportional votes in the traditionalistic states.

INTRODUCTION

More than thirty years have passed since the revised second edition of Daniel Elazar's *American Federalism: A View from the States* (Elazar, 1972). In this work he presented a continuum of the American states based on the concept of political culture, "the particular pattern of orientation to political action in which a political system is embedded" (Elazar, 1972: 89). Political culture refers to how different groups of people define politics and the proper role of government in society and in the economy. When the subcategories are collapsed (which is necessary for empirical inquiry due to lack of variance), Elazar basically determined that the American national culture is a synthesis of three major political subcultures that exist simultaneously and often overlap (Elazar, 1972: 118). Each subculture is reflective of historical migration patterns that have led certain people of different origins and backgrounds across the United States. Elazar identifies these subcultures as moralistic, individualistic, and traditionalistic (Elazar, 1972: 93-102). Seventeen states are classified as having a predominantly moralistic political culture (Vermont, Minnesota, Utah, Maine, Michigan, Wisconsin, North Dakota, Colorado, Oregon, New Hampshire, Iowa,

Kansas, California, Washington, Montana, South Dakota, and Idaho). Seventeen states are identified for being a predominantly individualistic political culture (Connecticut, Rhode Island, Nebraska, Wyoming, Massachusetts, New York, Ohio, Illinois, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Indiana, Nevada, Alaska, Delaware, Maryland, Missouri, and Hawaii). Elazar opined that the remaining sixteen states have a predominantly traditionalistic political culture (Texas, Oklahoma, West Virginia, Kentucky, Florida, New Mexico, Alabama, Georgia, Arkansas, Louisiana, Virginia, South Carolina, Mississippi, Tennessee, Arizona, and North Carolina) (Elazar, 1972: 93-102).

Additionally, by 1972, widespread primary elections were in place in the United States. 1968 marked the last time that party leaders directly selected the nominee (Hubert Humphrey for the Democrats, who had not entered a single primary). Humphrey's selection at the 1968 Democratic Convention was extremely disappointing to the supporters of Robert Kennedy and Eugene McCarthy, and prompted a democratization of the presidential nomination process, which affected both major parties in the United States by 1972 and beyond (Polsby and Wildavsky, 2000: 97-150).

Research Question

Elazar's typology of the American states can be utilized in order to determine whether or not citizens from state states are more inclined to support Democratic, Republican, and third party presidential candidates, an area of research that has not been investigated sufficiently to date. Thus, the central research question in this evaluation is:

Does political culture affect the outcome of presidential elections in the United States?

In other words, are residents in certain states more inclined to support specific presidential candidates than others?

It is hypothesized, in a general sense, that political culture affects the outcome of presidential elections:

H_1: Political culture (X) affects the outcome of presidential elections (Y) in the United States.

The null hypothesis is that there is no relationship between political culture and U.S. presidential elections:

$$H_o: \beta = 0$$

The District of Columbia

Although the District is not a state *per se*, it does have three votes in the Electoral College in presidential elections. Based upon the criteria used for classification by Elazar (1972: 103-19), as well as the geographical location of

the District, it makes intuitive sense to classify it as an individualistic dominant political culture on the continuum where both Maryland and Delaware are located.

Specifying the Model

The dependent variables (Y) in this analysis are the percentages of the popular votes received by the major party candidates in each state as well as some third party candidates in presidential elections from 1972 to 2000, inclusive (U.S. Election Atlas, 2002). The national results of these elections are presented in Table 1.

Table 1
Presidential Election Results, 1972-2000[1]

	% Popular Vote (R)[2]	Electoral Vote (R)	% Popular Vote (D)[3]	Electoral Vote (D)	% Popular Vote (3rd Party)[4]	Electoral Vote (3rd Party)
1972	60.7	520	37.5	17	—	1[5]
1976	48.0	241	50.1	297	—	—
1980	50.8	489	41.0	49	6.6	0
1984	58.8	525	41.0	13	—	—
1988	53.4	426	45.7	112	—	—
1992	37.5	168	43.0	370	18.9	0
1996	40.7	159	49.2	379	8.4	0
2000	47.9	271	48.4	266	2.7	0

[1] The data utilized are available at www.uselectionatlas.org.
[2] The Republican candidates are Richard Nixon (1972), Gerald Ford (1976), Ronald Reagan (1980 and
   1984), George H.W. Bush (1988 and 1992), Bob Dole (1996), and George W. Bush (2000).
[3] The Democratic candidates are George McGovern (1972), Jimmy Carter (1976 and 1980), Walter
   Mondale (1984), Michael Dukakis (1988), Bill Clinton (1992 and 1996), and Al Gore (2000).
[4] The third party candidates of interest are John Anderson (National Union) in 1980; Ross Perot
   (Independent) in 1992; Ross Perot (Reform) in 1996; and Ralph Nader (Green) in 2000.
[5] One Electoral vote was cast for John Hospers (Libertarian).

Since the explanatory variables (X) are the three political subcultures, the most plausible manner in which to measure them is by creating three dichotomous, or dummy, variables.

Using Dummy Variables in Regression Analysis

Dummy variables only take on the values of one or zero; in order to prevent perfect multicollinearity, one category is omitted. The β coefficients reflect the changes in the dependent variable with respect to the reference group (the group that is left out). The intercept reflects the value of the dependent variable for the reference group. The t-ratio is utilized to determine whether or not that group differs statistically from the reference group (Schroeder, Sjoquist, and Stephan, 1991: 56-8).

Three equations are created in order to empirically test H_1:

Equation #1: $PV = \alpha + \beta_1$ (Moralistic) $+ \beta_2$ (Individualistic) $+ e$

Where,

PV=proportion of the popular vote for presidential candidates;
α=value of the dependent variable for the reference group (traditionalistic);
Moralistic=dummy variable (1=states with a predominantly moralistic political culture; 0=otherwise);
Individualistic=dummy variable (1=states with a predominantly individualistic political culture; 0=otherwise); and e=error term.

Equation #2: $PV = \alpha + \beta_1$ (Moralistic) $+ \beta_2$ (Traditionalistic) $+ e$

Where,

α=value of the dependent variable for the reference group (individualistic);
Moralistic=dummy variable (1=states with a predominantly moralistic political culture; 0=otherwise);
Traditionalistic=dummy variable (1=states with a predominantly traditionalistic political culture; 0=otherwise); and
e=error term.

Equation #3: $PV = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{(Individualistic)} + \beta_2 \text{(Traditionalistic)} + e$

Where,

> PV=proportion of the popular vote for presidential candidates;
> α=value of the dependent variable for the reference group (moralistic);
> Individualistic=dummy variable (1=states with a predominantly individualistic political culture; 0=otherwise);
> Traditionalistic=dummy variable (1=states with a predominantly traditionalistic political culture; 0=otherwise); and
> e=error term.

The following Democratic (D) presidential candidates are scrutinized in this evaluation: George McGovern (1972); Jimmy Carter (1976 and 1980); Walter Mondale (1984); Michael Dukakis (1988); Bill Clinton (1992 and 1996); and Al Gore (2000). The Republicans (R) include Richard Nixon (1972); Gerald Ford (1976); Ronald Reagan (1980 and 1984); George H.W. Bush (1988 and 1992); Bob Dole (1996) and George W. Bush (2000). Third party candidates are included in 1980 (John Anderson–National Unity); 1992 (Ross Perot–Independent); 1996 (Ross Perot–Reform); and 2000 (Ralph Nader–Green). The statistical results are presented in Tables 2-9 and are accompanied by an interpretation for each election.

Table 2
1972 Presidential Election

Moralistic and Individualistic Political Cultures
(Reference Group=Traditionalistic Political Culture)

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for Richard Nixon (R)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	68.8**	1.9
Dummy Moralistic	-9.5**	2.6
Dummy Individualistic	-10.5**	2.6

R-Squared=0.29

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for George McGovern (D)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	29.4**	2.0
Dummy Moralistic	8.3**	2.7
Dummy Individualistic	11.2**	2.7

R-Squared=0.28

Moralistic and Traditionalistic Political Cultures
(Reference Group=Individualistic Political Culture)

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for Richard Nixon (R)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	58.3**	1.8
Dummy Moralistic	1.0	2.5
Dummy Traditionalistic	10.5**	2.6

R-Squared=0.29

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for George McGovern (D)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	40.6**	1.8
Dummy Moralistic	-2.9	2.6
Dummy Traditionalistic	-11.2**	2.7

R-Squared=0.28

Individualistic and Traditionalistic Political Cultures
(Reference Group=Moralistic Political Culture)

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for Richard Nixon (R)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	59.3**	1.8
Dummy Individualistic	-1.0	2.5
Dummy Traditionalistic	9.5**	2.6

R-Squared=0.29

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for George McGovern (D)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	37.7**	1.9
Dummy Individualistic	2.9	2.6
Dummy Traditionalistic	-8.3**	2.7

R-Squared=0.28

** Significant at the .01 level
* Significant at the .05 level

Table 3
1976 Presidential Election

Moralistic and Individualistic Political Cultures
(Reference Group=Traditionalistic Political Culture)

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for Gerald Ford (R)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	45.2**	1.7
Dummy Moralistic	6.6**	2.4
Dummy Individualistic	2.9	2.4

R-Squared=0.13

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for Jimmy Carter (D)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	53.4**	1.8
Dummy Moralistic	-7.9**	2.6
Dummy Individualistic	-3.5	2.5

R-Squared=0.17

Moralistic and Traditionalistic Political Cultures
(Reference Group=Individualistic Political Culture)

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for Gerald Ford (R)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	48.1**	1.6
Dummy Moralistic	3.6	2.3
Dummy Traditionalistic	-2.9	2.4

R-Squared=0.13

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for Jimmy Carter (D)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	50.0**	1.7
Dummy Moralistic	-4.5	2.5
Dummy Traditionalistic	3.5	2.5

R-Squared=0.17

Individualistic and Traditionalistic Political Cultures
(Reference Group=Moralistic Political Culture)

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for Gerald Ford (R)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	51.7**	1.7
Dummy Individualistic	-3.6	2.3
Dummy Traditionalistic	-6.6**	2.4

R-Squared=0.13

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for Jimmy Carter (D)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	45.5**	1.8
Dummy Individualistic	4.5	2.5
Dummy Traditionalistic	7.9**	2.6

R-Squared=0.17

** Significant at the .01 level
* Significant at the .05 level

Table 4
1980 Presidential Election

Moralistic and Individualistic Political Cultures
(Reference Group=Traditionalistic Political Culture)

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for Ronald Reagan (R)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	51.4**	2.2
Dummy Moralistic	2.9	3.1
Dummy Individualistic	-2.7	3.1

R-Squared=0.07

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for Jimmy Carter (D)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	44.1**	2.2
Dummy Moralistic	-9.3**	3.0
Dummy Individualistic	-3.2	3.0

R-Squared=0.17

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for John Anderson (I)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	3.4**	0.7
Dummy Moralistic	5.4**	0.9
Dummy Individualistic	4.8**	0.9

R-Squared=0.47

Moralistic and Traditionalistic Political Cultures
(Reference Group=Individualistic Political Culture)

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for Ronald Reagan (R)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	48.7**	2.1
Dummy Moralistic	5.6	3.0
Dummy Traditionalistic	2.7	3.1

R-Squared=0.07

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for Jimmy Carter (D)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	40.9**	2.0
Dummy Moralistic	-6.1*	2.9
Dummy Traditionalistic	3.2	3.0

R-Squared=0.17

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for John Anderson (I)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	8.2**	0.6
Dummy Moralistic	0.6	0.9
Dummy Traditionalistic	-4.8**	0.9

R-Squared=0.47

Individualistic and Traditionalistic Political Cultures
(Reference Group=Moralistic Political Culture)

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for Ronald Reagan (R)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	54.3**	2.2
Dummy Individualistic	-5.6	3.0
Dummy Traditionalistic	-2.9	3.1

R-Squared=0.07

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for Jimmy Carter (D)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	34.8**	2.1
Dummy Individualistic	6.1*	2.9
Dummy Traditionalistic	9.3**	3.0

R-Squared=0.17

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for John Anderson (I)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	8.8**	0.6
Dummy Individualistic	-0.6	0.9
Dummy Traditionalistic	-5.4**	0.9

R-Squared=0.47

** Significant at the .01 level
* Significant at the .05 level

Table 5
1984 Presidential Election

Moralistic and Individualistic Political Cultures
(Reference Group=Traditionalistic Political Culture)

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for Ronald Reagan (R)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	61.3**	2.1
Dummy Moralistic	-0.7	3.0
Dummy Individualistic	-5.0	2.9

R-Squared=0.07

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for Walter Mondale (D)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	37.6**	2.2
Dummy Moralistic	0.4	3.0
Dummy Individualistic	4.8	3.0

R-Squared=0.06

Moralistic and Traditionalistic Political Cultures
(Reference Group=Individualistic Political Culture)

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for Ronald Reagan (R)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	56.8**	2.0
Dummy Moralistic	4.2	2.9
Dummy Traditionalistic	5.0	2.9

R-Squared=0.07

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for Walter Mondale (D)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	42.4**	2.0
Dummy Moralistic	-4.3	2.9
Dummy Traditionalistic	-4.8	3.0

R-Squared=0.06

Individualistic and Traditionalistic Political Cultures
(Reference Group=Moralistic Political Culture)

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for Ronald Reagan (R)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	61.0**	2.1
Dummy Individualistic	-4.2	2.9
Dummy Traditionalistic	0.7	3.0

R-Squared=0.07

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for Walter Mondale (D)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	38.0**	2.1
Dummy Individualistic	4.3	2.9
Dummy Traditionalistic	-0.4	3.0

R-Squared=0.06

** Significant at the .01 level
* Significant at the .05 level

Table 6
1988 Presidential Election

Moralistic and Individualistic Political Cultures
(Reference Group=Traditionalistic Political Culture)

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for George H.W. Bush (R)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	57.3**	1.9
Dummy Moralistic	-4.0	2.6
Dummy Individualistic	-6.2*	2.6

R-Squared=0.11

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for Michael Dukakis (D)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	41.9**	1.9
Dummy Moralistic	3.6	2.6
Dummy Individualistic	5.8*	2.6

R-Squared=0.10

Moralistic and Traditionalistic Political Cultures
(Reference Group=Individualistic Political Culture)

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for George H.W. Bush (R)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	51.0**	1.8
Dummy Moralistic	2.2	2.6
Dummy Traditionalistic	6.2*	2.6

R-Squared=0.11

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for Michael Dukakis (D)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	47.7**	1.8
Dummy Moralistic	-2.2	2.5
Dummy Traditionalistic	-5.8*	2.6

R-Squared=0.10

Individualistic and Traditionalistic Political Cultures
(Reference Group=Moralistic Political Culture)

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for George H.W. Bush (R)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	53.2**	1.8
Dummy Individualistic	-2.2	2.6
Dummy Traditionalistic	4.0	2.6

R-Squared=0.11

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for Michael Dukakis (D)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	45.5**	1.8
Dummy Individualistic	2.2	2.5
Dummy Traditionalistic	-3.6	2.6

R-Squared=0.10

** Significant at the .01 level
* Significant at the .05 level

Table 7
1992 Presidential Election

Moralistic and Individualistic Political Cultures
(Reference Group=Traditionalistic Political Culture)

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for George H.W. Bush (R)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	42.0**	1.4
Dummy Moralistic	-5.7**	2.0
Dummy Individualistic	-7.0**	2.0

R-Squared=0.22

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for Bill Clinton (D)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	42.5**	2.1
Dummy Moralistic	-3.6	2.9
Dummy Individualistic	2.0	2.9

R-Squared=0.08

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for Ross Perot (I)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	14.9**	1.2
Dummy Moralistic	8.9**	1.6
Dummy Individualistic	4.7**	1.6

R-Squared=0.39

Moralistic and Traditionalistic Political Cultures
(Reference Group=Individualistic Political Culture)

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for George H.W. Bush (R)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	35.1**	1.4
Dummy Moralistic	1.3	2.0
Dummy Traditionalistic	7.0**	2.0

R-Squared=0.22

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for Bill Clinton (D)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	44.5**	2.0
Dummy Moralistic	-5.6	2.8
Dummy Traditionalistic	-2.0	2.9

R-Squared=0.08

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for Ross Perot (I)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	19.6**	1.1
Dummy Moralistic	4.1*	1.6
Dummy Traditionalistic	-4.7**	1.6

R-Squared=0.39

Individualistic and Traditionalistic Political Cultures
(Reference Group=Moralistic Political Culture)

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for George H.W. Bush (R)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	36.4**	1.4
Dummy Individualistic	-1.3	2.0
Dummy Traditionalistic	5.7**	2.0

R-Squared=0.22

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for Bill Clinton (D)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	38.9**	2.0
Dummy Individualistic	5.6	2.8
Dummy Traditionalistic	3.6	2.9

R-Squared=0.08

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for Ross Perot (I)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	23.7**	1.1
Dummy Individualistic	-4.1*	1.6
Dummy Traditionalistic	-8.9**	1.6

R-Squared=0.39

** Significant at the .01 level
* Significant at the .05 level

Table 8
1996 Presidential Election

Moralistic and Individualistic Political Cultures
(Reference Group=Traditionalistic Political Culture)

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for Bob Dole (R)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	45.1**	2.0
Dummy Moralistic	-3.2	2.7
Dummy Individualistic	-7.6**	2.7

R-Squared=0.14

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for Bill Clinton (D)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	46.6**	2.1
Dummy Moralistic	-0.9	2.9
Dummy Individualistic	4.8	2.9

R-Squared=0.09

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for Ross Perot (R)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	7.4**	0.5
Dummy Moralistic	2.8**	0.7
Dummy Individualistic	1.8*	0.7

R-Squared=0.24

Moralistic and Traditionalistic Political Cultures
(Reference Group=Individualistic Political Culture)

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for Bob Dole (R)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	37.5**	1.9
Dummy Moralistic	4.4	2.7
Dummy Traditionalistic	7.6**	2.7

R-Squared=0.14

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for Bill Clinton (D)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	51.4**	2.0
Dummy Moralistic	-5.7*	2.8
Dummy Traditionalistic	-4.8	2.9

R-Squared=0.09

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for Ross Perot (R)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	9.2**	0.5
Dummy Moralistic	1.0	0.7
Dummy Traditionalistic	-1.8*	0.7

R-Squared=0.24

Individualistic and Traditionalistic Political Cultures
(Reference Group=Moralistic Political Culture)

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for Bob Dole (R)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	41.9**	1.9
Dummy Individualistic	-4.4	2.7
Dummy Traditionalistic	3.2	2.7

R-Squared=0.14

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for Bill Clinton (D)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	45.7**	2.0
Dummy Individualistic	5.7*	2.8
Dummy Traditionalistic	0.9	2.9

R-Squared=0.09

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for Ross Perot (R)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	10.2**	0.5
Dummy Individualistic	-1.0	0.7
Dummy Traditionalistic	-2.8**	0.7

R-Squared=0.24

** Significant at the .01 level
* Significant at the .05 level

Table 9
2000 Presidential Election

Moralistic and Individualistic Political Cultures
(Reference Group=Traditionalistic Political Culture)

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for George W. Bush (R)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	54.1**	2.4
Dummy Moralistic	-2.5	3.4
Dummy Individualistic	-10.0**	3.3

R-Squared=0.17

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for Al Gore (D)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	43.6**	2.4
Dummy Moralistic	-0.6	3.4
Dummy Individualistic	7.6*	3.3

R-Squared=0.14

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for Ralph Nader (G)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	1.4**	0.5
Dummy Moralistic	2.6**	0.6
Dummy Individualistic	2.2**	0.6

R-Squared=0.28

Moralistic and Traditionalistic Political Cultures
(Reference Group=Individualistic Political Culture)

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for George W. Bush (R)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	44.1**	2.3
Dummy Moralistic	7.5*	3.3
Dummy Traditionalistic	10.0**	3.3

R-Squared=0.17

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for Al Gore (D)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	51.2**	2.3
Dummy Moralistic	-8.2*	3.3
Dummy Traditionalistic	-7.6*	3.3

R-Squared=0.14

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for Ralph Nader (G)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	3.6**	0.4
Dummy Moralistic	0.4	0.6
Dummy Traditionalistic	-2.2**	0.6

R-Squared=0.28

Individualistic and Traditionalistic Political Cultures
(Reference Group=Moralistic Political Culture)

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for George W. Bush (R)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	51.5**	2.4
Dummy Individualistic	-7.5*	3.3
Dummy Traditionalistic	2.5	3.4

R-Squared=0.17

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for Al Gore (D)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	43.0**	2.3
Dummy Individualistic	8.2*	3.3
Dummy Traditionalistic	0.6	3.4

R-Squared=0.14

Y=Proportion of Popular Vote for Ralph Nader (G)

Explanatory variable (X)	Regression coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	4.0**	0.4
Dummy Individualistic	-0.4	0.6
Dummy Traditionalistic	-2.6**	0.6

R-Squared=0.28

** Significant at the .01 level
* Significant at the .05 level

1972

The intercepts indicate that Nixon fared the best in the traditionalistic states (68.8 percent), followed by the moralistic states (59.3 percent), and the individualistic states (58.3 percent). Conversely, McGovern received 40.6 percent of the popular vote in the individualistic states, 37.7 percent in the moralistic states, and 29.4 percent in the traditionalistic states. As the slope coefficients illustrate, even in this lopsided victory for Nixon, culture did matter, at

least to some measurable extent. Nixon's margin of victory diminished in the individualistic (-10.5 percent) and moralistic (-9.5 percent) states as compared to the traditionalistic states. McGovern's showing was better in the individualistic (+11.2 percent) and the moralistic (+8.3 percent) states relative to the traditionalistic states.

1976

This close election is definitive, at least from one perspective. One of the candidates, Jimmy Carter, was a southerner and a Democrat. This may have been beneficial upon examining the three political subcultures. Carter fared the best in the traditionalistic states (53.4 percent), followed by the individualistic states (50 percent), and the moralistic states (45.5 percent). No Democrat until Bill Clinton in 1992 and 1996 has carried a plurality of the vote in the traditionalistic states since this election. Ford's best showing occurred in the moralistic states (51.7 percent), then the individualistic states (48.1 percent), and the traditionalistic states (45.2 percent). For both Carter and Ford, the differences between the moralistic and traditionalistic states are statistically significant.

1980

Reagan recaptured the traditionalistic states for the Republicans (51.4 percent) and garnered 54.3 percent of the popular vote in the moralistic states and a plurality of 48.7 percent in the individualistic states in this "three person" race. None of the slope values for Reagan are statistically significant suggesting that his support was fairly uniform across all three subcultures. Carter, once again, fared best in the traditionalistic states (44.1 percent), then the individualistic states (40.9 percent) and the moralistic states (34.8 percent). Carter's support was less uniform–there were statistically significant differences by culture (i.e., he received a higher percentage of the popular vote in the traditionalistic states (9.3 percent) and the individualistic states (6.1 percent) than in the moralistic states). Anderson fared best in the moralistic states (8.8 percent), followed by the individualistic states (8.2 percent), and the traditionalistic states (3.4 percent). Clearly, his support was much higher in the moralistic states than the traditionalistic states.

1984

Not surprisingly given the outcome of the election (Reagan won 59 percent of the popular vote and 525 of 538 votes in the Electoral College), culture did not matter in this election. Note that none of the slope coefficients of the

dummy variables are statistically significant. Reagan received 61.3 percent, 61 percent, and 56.8 percent of the vote in the traditionalistic, moralistic, and individualistic states, respectively. Mondale received 42.4 percent of the vote in the individualistic states, 38 percent in the moralistic states, and 37.6 percent in the traditionalistic states.

1988

George H.W. Bush (Bush I) received a majority of the vote in all three subcultures (57.3 percent in the traditionalistic states; 53.2 percent in the moralistic states; and 51 percent in the individualistic states. Dukakis, like Mondale four years earlier, had his best results in the individualistic states (47.7 percent), followed by the moralistic states (45.5 percent), and then the traditionalistic states (41.9 percent). Bush I received a higher percentage of the vote (6.2 percent) in the traditionalistic states than the individualistic states. Dukakis, conversely, received a higher proportion of the popular vote in the individualistic states (5.8 percent) than in the traditionalistic states.

1992

The 1992 election has particular intrigue due to the relative success of Independent Ross Perot. The intercepts indicate that Clinton won a plurality in all three subcultures (44.5 percent in the individualistic states; 42.5 percent in the traditionalistic states; and 38.9 percent in the moralistic states). Bush I finished in second in all three categories (42 percent in the traditionalistic states; 36.4 in the moralistic states; and 35.1 percent in the individualistic states). Bush I registered statistically significant differences by culture, as he garnered 5.7 percent less of the vote in the moralistic states and 7 percent less in the individualistic states compared to the traditionalistic states. The slope coefficients for the dummy variables are not significantly different from zero for Clinton. Perot's greatest success occurred in the moralistic states ($\alpha=23.7$ percent) as compared to 19.6 percent in the individualistic states and 14.9 percent in the traditionalistic states. The slope values for the dummy variables are all statistically significant for Perot, an affirmation of the intercepts in all three subcultures.

1996

In his reelection, Clinton again won all three subcultures (51.4 percent of the popular vote in the individualistic states; 46.6 percent in the traditionalistic states; and 45.7 percent in the moralistic states). Like Bush I, Dole finished second in all three (45.1 percent, 41.9 percent, and 37.5 percent in the

traditionalistic, moralistic, and individualistic states, respectively). While Perot's support declined considerably from the 1992 election, he still fared best in the moralistic states (α=10.2 percent) as compared to 9.2 percent in the individualistic states and 7.4 percent in the traditionalistic states. For Clinton, he registered a statistically significant difference between the individualistic (+5.7 percent) states and the moralistic states. Dole fared much better (+7.6 percent) in the traditionalistic states than the individualistic states. Not unlike 1992, Perot garnered more votes in the moralistic and individualistic states than he did in the traditionalistic states.

2000

Similar to most of his Democratic predecessors in this time period, Gore, the popular vote winner, had his best popular vote tally in the individualistic states (α=51.2 percent), followed by the traditionalistic states (43.6 percent) and the moralistic states (43 percent). George W. Bush (Bush II) achieved a significant margin over Gore in this close election in the traditionalistic subculture (α=54.1 percent) and the moralistic subculture (α=51.5 percent). In fact, Bush II received 10 percent more of the popular vote in the traditionalistic states than he did in the individualistic states. He also garnered 7.5 percent more of the popular vote in the moralistic states than in the individualistic states. Conversely, the slope coefficient for the dummy individualistic variable achieved significance for Gore when referenced with the traditionalistic subculture (+7.6 percent). The same holds constant for the dummy individualistic variable when referenced with the moralistic subculture (+8.2 percent). For Ralph Nader, there are no statistically significant differences between his support in the moralistic (4 percent) states and the individualistic (3.6 percent) states. He did, however, fare much worse in the traditionalistic states (1.4 percent). His pattern of support is quite similar to Perot's in 1992 and 1996 and Anderson's in 1980, as there are significant differences between the subcultures when referenced with the traditionalistic states (+ 2.6 percent in the moralistic states and +2.2 percent in the individualistic states).

Implications

Election 2000 reinforced what had transpired in presidential elections since 1972. Republican presidential candidates tend to yield their best popular vote totals in the states with a predominantly traditionalistic political culture. Democratic presidential candidates typically garner their highest proportional tallies in the states with a predominantly individualistic political culture. The

states in the predominantly moralistic political culture category tend to be fairly competitive for both major parties in an aggregate sense. Significant, at least in an American context, third party candidates in the recent past have attracted more popular support in the predominantly moralistic and individualistic states than in the predominantly traditionalistic states.

The fact that Republican presidential candidates, representatives of the more politically conservative political party, do well in the traditionalistic states is certainly not counterintuitive. The once "Solid South" (see Key, Jr. 1949) is now fairly strong Republican territory in presidential elections. The settlement patterns, especially in the southern states, are reflective of a statist, precommercial attitude that accepts a hierarchical social, economic, and political structure as a natural order of things and a means in which to maintain the status quo (Elazar, 1972: 99-102).

Although there is a strong tendency for people in the individualistic subculture to view politics as a somewhat unsavory business, Democratic presidential candidates, representatives of the more politically liberal party, tend to attract a good deal of support from this subculture. Government is viewed as a marketplace that exists for purely utilitarian reasons and should only address those functions demanded by the people (Elazar, 1972: 94-6). Perhaps citizens in these states generally share the perspective that Democratic presidential candidates can better address their policy concerns than their Republican counterparts.

Within the moralistic states, where the commonwealth concept is emphasized and politics is viewed in a positive manner because it can promote a better society (Elazar, 1972: 96-9), clearly there is an interesting schism. Republican presidential candidates generally do well in Utah, North Dakota, Colorado, Kansas, Montana, South Dakota, and Idaho. Democrats generally are favored more in Vermont, Minnesota, Maine, Oregon, California, and Washington, while the remaining states tend to be quite competitive, at least in recent years.

As election 2000 illustrated, presidential contenders become the national chief executive only when they garner 270 or more votes in the Electoral College. Thus, although the members of the mass media focus on the horse race between the major party candidates via public opinion polling, it is the race to 270 that is crucial. It would, therefore, behoove professional political consultants to consider political culture in their strategizing. Consider the next presidential election (2004) by way of illustration. With redistricting due to the 2000 federal census in the House of Representatives, the individualistic states account for 189 votes

(35.1 percent) in the Electoral College, followed by 188 (34.9 percent) for the traditionalistic states, and 161 (29.9 percent) in the moralistic states. As a result, even if the Republican candidate triumphed in all the traditionalistic states, and the Democratic candidate did the same in all the individualistic states, the race for the presidency would be won (or lost) in the moralistic states.

Concluding Thoughts

As Professor Elazar indicated:
The names given the three political subcultures are meant to be descriptive, not evaluative. By the same token, the descriptions of the three that follow are intended to be models or ideal types that are not likely to be fully extant in the real world. Each of the three reflects its own particular synthesis of the marketplace and the commonwealth (Elazar, 1984: 115).

Over the past thirty years, his typology has been a focal point in a great deal of normative and empirical inquiry. Political culture does make a difference in presidential electoral outcomes. More investigation and inquiry as to why this is the case, albeit due to local ecological factors or a potential host of other significant variables, will undoubtedly result in a much more substantive understanding of American presidential elections. Such research would be invaluable to the academician and practitioner alike.

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