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DEMOCRACY AND WAR: AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH

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Abstract

Few issues have attracted more scholarly attention in recent years than the claims that democracies are more peaceful than dictatorships and that they do not go to war against each other. The present study improves upon previous research on the "democracy peace theory" by using both a more valid indicator of aggression (initiated conflictual acts) and by considering a wider range of conflictual activity than just "war." Two central hypotheses are tested: 1) that democracies will initiate proportionally fewer conflictual acts than authoritarian systems; and 2) that the conflictual acts initiated by democracies will demonstrate a lower level of hostility per act. It tests these hypotheses for the ten "major powers" designated by Singer and Small (1976) and by using an events data-set developed by Siverson and Tennefoss (1982). In general, the results tend to support the proposition that democracies are indeed more peaceful than their nondemocratic counterparts.

No issue has attracted more scholarly attention in recent years than the claim that democracies are more peaceful (i.e., less "war-prone") than dictatorships. This "democratic peace theory" has become more influential as a result of two concurrent developments - 1) the stunning increase in the number of democracies around the world (a phenomenon often referred to as the "Global Democratic Revolution"); and 2) a growing body of empirical research suggesting that, in the words of President Bill Clinton, "democracies don't attack each other." This belief that democracies are inherently more peaceful than dictatorships, and that their numerical expansion therefore serves to create a growing "zone of peace" in world politics, has consequently become an important part of America's search for a viable post-Cold War foreign policy.

The following study goes beyond previous research by testing the democratic peace theory with both a more valid indicator of aggression (initiated conflictual acts) and by taking into account a wider range of conflictual activity than simply war. While the methodology and conceptualization may differ, the results tend to provide substantial support for the democracy equals peace proposition.

SO WHY WOULD DEMOCRACIES BE MORE PEACEFUL?

The belief that democracies are inherently more peaceful than dictatorships has a long intellectual pedigree. First articulated by Immanuel Kant in his essay "Perpetual Peace", and popularized earlier in this century by Woodrow Wilson, the "democratic peace theory" actually rests on two related causal explanations, one normative, the other structural.

The normative explanation stresses the emphasis on compromise and the rule of law found in democratic states; cultural values that are assumed to spill over into conduct of their foreign policies. As Bruce Russett, a prominent supporter of the democratic peace theory, puts it, "the culture, perceptions, and practices that permit compromise and the peaceful resolution of conflicts without the threat of violence within countries come to apply across national boundaries toward other democratic countries." Because of their "cultural" habits and expectations, then, democracies will naturally tend to favor peaceful means of settling disputes and will be in the forefront of efforts to uphold international law.

The "structural explanation refes, on the other hand, to the greater accountability and "checks and balances" provided by democratic institutions. In contrast to dictators, who, according to Kant, can "...resolve on war as on a pleasure party for the most trivial reasons," leaders in democratic states are forced to take into account public preferences and to defend their actions in the open air of public debate. Because in democratic states it is the people themselves who must voluntarily offer up the blood and treasure with which to wage war, war becomes a considerably more complicated undertaking. The presence of constitutional limits, periodic elections, and a free plress are thus assumede to moderate the aggressiveness of democratic foreign policy.

Putting these different but related arguments together, one can identify a number of basic claims in the democratic peace theory: 1) that democracies are, due to both normative and structural factors, more peaceful than dictatorships; 2) that democracies will not fight (and have not fought) other democracies because the influcenc of those normative and structural factors is magnified when they operate on both parties (democracies) in a dispute; and 3) that the spread of democracy therefore serves to create a "zone of peace" in world politics by reducing the number of dyadic opportunities available for war. It is also important to note that the two factors - values and institutions - which are thought to make democracies more peaceful are also widely acknowleded to operate in tandem, and to do so in such a complex fashion that it becomes difficult to disentangle one from the other.

Despite the logic behind the democratic peace theory, there remains a fair number of skeptics. Some of these skeptics contest the "democracies don't fight other democracies" claim by noting the difficulties of defining both democracy and war and the potential ways in which such definitions can be used to exclude troublesome cases (such as the War of 1812, the status of Willhelmine Germany in 1914, and the American Civil War). These critics also challenge the causal assumptions upon which the thoery depends, suggesting that the constraints imposed upon bellicose behaviro by democratic norms and institutions are not nearly as powerful as supporters of the democratic peace suggest. Within this context, they point out that other factors which might imply a higher proclivity toward war on the part of democracies and which are less relevant to the foreign policies of dictatorships - such as press sensationalism and mass susceptibility to jingoism - tend to get supsiciously short shrift in democratic peace arguments.

Perhaps most importantly, however, skeptics of the democracy peace linkage have suggested that, even if democracies do not fight each other all that often, ther is no guaranteee against their fighting plenty of wars with nondemocracies. Indeed, they suggest that, in a world likely to be made up of a mixture of democratic and nondemocratic states for some time to come, the "moralism" inherent in democratic foreign policy is likely to increase the probability of conflict with dictatorial regimes.

In terms of general propositions, then, those skeptical of the democratic peace theory rest their case o the folowing points - 1) that there are probably as many forces as work (such as mass hysteria and sensationalism in democratic states pushing them toward was as making them war averse; 2) that democracies are likely (because of their emphasis upon human rights and their tendency toward "moralistic crusades" to have particularly conflictual relations with nondemocracies; and 3) that democratic states are thus, as Quincy Wright argues more than half-a-century age, overall probably no more or less "war-prone" than their nondemocratic counterparts. Critics like Christopher Layne even go as far to suggest that the democratic peace theory might,

if too widely believed and integrated into American foreign policy, become itself a contributor to conflict, because zealotry on behalf of democracy might lead to dangerous confrontations with recalcitrant dictators who are thought to stand in the way of the democratic peace.

SOME PROBLEMS WITH THE RESEARCH THUS FAR

Given its intrinsic appeal and the conflicting arguments over its validity, it is not surprising that a substantial body of empirical research has been carried out to test the democratic peace theory. The problem is that it is difficult to draw any definite, or even partial, conclusions when surveying this vast literature. As with so many other controversies in international relations (the long-running debates over alliance behavior and the virtues of multipolarity vs. bipolarity come quickly to mind), the conceptual definitions, methodology, and findings differ, sometimes dramatically, from one study to the next.

While it is probably fair to say that most of the studies in the literature tend to support the "democracies don't fight other democracies" thesis, producing what one scholar calls "...as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations," the results on this question can hardly be considered unanimous. Likewise, research assessing the question of the "war-proneness" of democracies as a whole points to a somewhat contradictory conclusion - that democratic governments do, indeed, go to war about as often as other kinds of governments. This is little more than a roundabout way of saying that democrats and dictators do not mix and have fought lots of wars over time as a result (i.e., if democracies don't fight other democracies but they still fight just as many wars overall, it becomes fairly obvious who it is that they are fighting those wars with).

The larger problem, though, is that most of this democratic peace research also demonstrates some subtle but still serious methodological and conceptual shortcomings. The most important of these are 1) a tendency to simplistically define a country's foreign policy "aggressiveness" or "pacificity" by reference to its overall amount of "war involvement" (usually reflected in some statistical measure); and 2) a propensity to consider only "wars" (usually defined in some arbitrary, dichotomous war/no war manner) to the exclusion of other forms of conflict.

The first problem - the tendency to equate a given country's aggressiveness with its historical involvement in wars - is found in virtually all studies of the democratic peace theory. The problematic aspect here is the (highly) dubious assumption that all parties to a given conflict are equally responsible for causing it, a scholarly version of "moral equivalence" that should seem astonishing to any serious student of the history of war. This tendency to simply add up a nation's participation in wars, battle fatalities as a result of wars, months at war, etc. as indicators of "aggressiveness," and usually without any effort to identify who actually started those conflicts, produces some predictably bizarre results, with Germany and France, for instance, given equal credit for aggression when the former invaded the latter in 1940 and the Soviet Union and Afghanistan judged to be equally culpable when Soviet troops crossed the Afghan border in December 1979.

The second problem - the focus on only "wars" per se, often through the use of highly arbitrary, dichotomous definitions - produces equally peculiar results. Many such studies, including the one at hand, rely upon Singer and Small's 1976 definition of war, which defines it as any hostile interaction which resulted in more than 1,000

fatalities among military personnel. The problem in these cases is not so much that an arbitrary cutoff is used to define war (after all arbitrary aspects creep into most efforts at definition in the social sciences). Rather, it is that such cutoffs act to exclude from analysis all other hostile activity which fails to reach the cut-off level. Indeed, such a focus contradicts the widespread assumption that war, as only the most extreme form of conflict, is but the culmination of a previous sequence of lower-level hostile interaction. To disregard such lower-level activity when studying war is to therefore miss a substantial part of the conflict picture.

This focus on "war" pe se, and with the use of arbitrary definitions at that, can also produce some peculiar results - using Singer and Small's definition of war, for instance, a country that engaged in only one war in which 1,010 soldiers died would be judged more "war-prone" than another country that had been involved in dozens of lower-level conflicts, but no one of which had met the magic number of 1,000 fatalities. While such a scenario would indeed be unlikely, it does serve to illustrate the danger of looking only at war, rigidly defined, as a means of measuring the aggressiveness of nations.

A DIFFERENT WAY OF LOOKING AT THE ISSUE

Given these, and other problems with the existant literature, how can we better evaluate the democracy-peace linkage? The following analysis demonstrates that it can be done through the introduction of only a few, relatively minor methodological and conceptual changes.

First, in the present analysis the notion of "aggression" will be measured by a more valid indicator than simply a country's degree of war involvement - the number of initiated conflictual acts per nation-state over time. Such a measure avoids the "moral equivalence" assumption discussed earlier by recognizing a right codified in all existing theories of international and domestic law - the right to self-defense. Just as we do not consider the law-abiding citizen who acts to defend home and family against attack to be as morally responsible for the resulting "violence" as we do his attacker, we cannot discuss "war" and other forms of conflict at the international level without reference to whom is attacking whom. All parties to a given conflict are not, in other words, always equally to blame.

Second, conflictual activity will be assumed to consist of more than just involvement in major wars. A wider range of lower level conflictual activity, such as threats of force, military mobilizations, and unreciprocated uses of force, in addition to activity more commonly known as war, will be brought into the sample. While such a step still leaves some arbitrary distinctions (i.e., where does various forms of sub-war conflict end and the real thing begin?), it nonetheless moves us quite a bit closer toward a valid representation of concepts like "aggressiveness" and "conflict."

Finally, in order to avoid the dilution of findings through a failure to detect "invisible," independent variables (as has been the case for some studies which have overlooked factors like common NATO membership when explaining the lack of war between democracies), the longest reasonable time-line for which accurate data can be obtained should be used. For this reason and others, an events data-set developed by Siverson and Tennefoss (1982) covering the 1821-1965 period will serve as the primary data source.

MORE ON THE DATA SET

The advantages of the Siverson and Tennefoss data-set go beyond simply the broad time period dealt with. While citing 254 separate events (see the Appendix for a full listing) for the 1821-1965 era, their data-set also, and in contrast to most other data-sets used to test the democracy peace theory, specifies the "hostility levels" and initiating and target countries for each act. Their classificatory criteria for the different hostility levels are as follows:

1) Threat: either an explicit verbal statement threatening overt military mobilization, or mobilization itself directed at a target state or states but with no actual use of force. Although these situations are called threats, they also clearly could be thought of as crises as well.

2) Unreciprocated Military Action: direct military force taken by one state against a nonresponding target.

3) Reciprocated Military Action: military force taken by one state which provokes the target state to engage the initiator in military conflict resulting in less than 1,000 fatalities among military personnel.

4) Major Wars: military force taken by one state which provokes the target state to engage the initiator in military conflict resulting in more than 1,000 fatalities among military personnel.

THE SAMPLE (PARTICIPATING NATION-STATES):

In constructing their data-set, Siverson and Tennefoss limited participation to the ten "major powers" designated by Singer and Small (1976). The following table (Table I) lists these participants and the time periods for which they are included in the data-set.

TABLE I

SYSTEM ACTORS	TIME PERIOD
Austria-Hungary	1821-1918
France	1821-1940
	1945-1965
Great Britain	1821-1965
Prussia/Germany	1821-1918
	1923-1945
West Germany	1955-1965
Russia	1821-1917
	1922-1965
Sardinia/Italy	1860-1943
Japan	1895-1945
China	1950-1965
United States	1899-1965

The countries designated as "great powers" were chosen because they can be said to have dominated international politics during the time period under consideration (1821-1965). On a more pragmatic note, the problem of identifying the type of political system involved (democracy or dictatorship) is also substantially reduced because of the far more extensive information available on the domestic politics of such major powers.

In summary, the Siverson-Tennefoss data includes all of the conflicts that the ten major powers had with each other, as well as with other nations. The sample has the additional virtue of including states which were either consistently democratic or non-democratic over time (the United States, Russia, and China), as well as a number whose status changed on occasion (Italy and Germany).

CONSTRUCTING SOME HYPOTHESES:

At this point, having presented the data-set and before discussing the issue of regime classification, it might be useful to disentangle the strands of logic holding up the democratic peace theory and to specify the hypotheses to be tested.

Hypothesis #1: That democracies will initiate proportionally fewer conflictual acts over time than will nondemocracies. More specifically, democracies will initiate fewer conflictual acts per year, as a group, than will their non-democratic counterparts. The reasoning behind this is as discussed earlier: that democracies, because of both structural constraints and normative values, will find it more difficult to initiate conflict.

Hypothesis #2: The conflictual acts which democracies initiate will demonstrate, on the average, a lower level of hostility than those acts initiated by nondemocracies. In contrast to Hypothesis #1, Hypothesis #2 implies that, with the actual initiation of force a less viable option, democracies will rely to a disproportionate degree upon less violent tactics (threats, military maneuvers, etc.) when engaging in disputes with other nations. Thus, this hypothesis suggests that, while all nations will at times initiate conflict, the conflict initiated by democracies will be distributed more at the lower levels of hostility (levels 1 and 2 in the data-set) than will that of nondemocracies. The same pressures which discourage democratic conflict initiation will therefore also act, in the event of such an initiation, to keep most disputes below the level of major military clashes or war.

In effect, then, the preceding hypotheses test the same general proposition tested in previous research: are democracies more or less belligerent/aggressive than their non-democratic counterparts? However, within this analysis, such a proposition is tested for a considerably longer time-frame (144 years), with a more valid indicator of aggressiveness (initiated conflictual acts), and by including a wider range of conflict behavior (threats at level 1 to full-scale wars at level 4).

SO WHEN DID A DEMOCRACY BECOME A DEMOCRACY?

Singer and Small's (1976) criteria were used to determine which of the sample states qualified as democracies and for what periods. Those criteria consist of: 1) the holding of periodically scheduled elections in which opposition parties are as free to

run as government parties; 2) at least 10 percent of the adult population is allowed to vote either directly or indirectly; and 3) a parliament that either controls or enjoys equality with the executive branch. A fourth requirement was also added to the definition - that there exist the secret ballot and other basic civil liberties - on the assumption that the exercise of democratic rights can only have meaning if they are accompanied by such liberties (particularly freedom of speech and press). All states in the sample which demonstrated these attributes were considered democracies, all others as nondemocracies. Analysis of the sample in lieu of these criteria produced the following classifications:

TABLE II (DEMOCRATIC SAMPLE)

INCLUDED STATE	TOTAL YEARS IN SURVEY	DEMOCRATIC IN SURVEY	DEMO. PERIOD	YEARS
Italy	(1860-1943)	(83)	(1882-1932)	(52)
W.Germany	(1955-1965)	(10)	(1955-1965)	(10)
Germany	(1821-1918)	(119) (1923-1945)	(1923-1933)	(10)
Britain	(1821-1965)	(144)	(1867-1965)	(98)
France	(1821-1940)	(139) (1945-1965)	(1871-1940)	(89)
U.S.	(1899-1965)	(66)	(1899-1965)	(66)

*Total Democratic Years = 325

TABLE III (NON-DEMOCRATIC SAMPLE)

STATE	INCLUDED IN SURVEY	TOTAL YEARS IN SURVEY	NONDEM PERIOD	NONDEM. YEARS
Italy (1860-1943)	(83) (1934-1943)		(1860-1881)	(31)
Austria	(1821-1918)	(97)	(1821-1918)	(97)
China	(1950-1965)	(15)	(1950-1965)	(15)
Japan	(1895-1945)	(50)	(1895-1945)	(50)
Russia	(1821-1917) (1922-1965)	(139)	(1821-1917) (1922-1965)	(139)
Germany	(1821-1918) (1923-1945)	(119)	(1821-1918) (1933-1945)	(109)
Britain	(1821-1965)	(144)	(1821-1867)	(46)
France	(1821-1940) (1945-1965)	(139)	(1821-1871)	(50)

*Total Non-Democratic Years = 537

THE INEVITABLE CAVEATS

In examining Tables II and III, it becomes obvious that the demarcation points separating the democratic and nondemocratic categories are often, and inevitably, less than precise. Still, a majority of the countries in the sample retained the same status

throughout their inclusion in the survey - the United States and West Germany on the democratic side, Russia, China, Japan, and Austria-Hungary in the nondemocratic category. In such cases, historical opinion is remarkably consistent as to the democratic/nondemocratic nature of the regimes and it was a simple task to check their "fit" vis-a-vis the four classificatory criteria.

Problems emerge, however, for those cases involving some kind of regime "transition," whether from dictatorship to democracy or vice versa. There also tended to be two kinds of such cases in the survey - 1) those states (Britain and France) which made the move from nondemocratic to democratic; and 2) those states (Germany and Italy) which flopped back and forth between the categories. In dealing with these cases, it was necessary to identify key "turning points" in their historical development as a basis for demarcation, examples being the 1867 Reform Bill for Britain and the 1870 revolution for France. In Italy's case, the democratization process was felt to have been fully consumated with the electoral reforms of 1882, and subsequently reversed when Mussolini and his Fascist Party fully consolidated their control circa 1934. Lastly, Prussia/Germany's lone experience with democratic rule - the Weimar Republic - decisively ended with Hitler's inauguration as chancellor in 1933. West Germany then reappears in the sample, under the appropriate democratic category, for the 1955-65 period.

Although legitimate questions can be raised about the use of such turning points, or about the particular events chosen as turning points for different countries, it is unlikely that different methods would have produced a significantly different classification scheme. Indeed, the democratic - nondemocratic classifications noted in Tables II and III seem to correspond fairly closely to the breakdowns found in other studies of democracy and democratization.

SORTING THROUGH THE DATA

After having classified the sample into the requisite democratic and non-democratic categories, it was then simply a question of adding up the conflictual acts initiated by each country while a member of each category. The total number of acts within each category was then obtained by adding the individual state totals, with a group mean determined by dividing this total by the total number of years in each category (325 and 537 years, respectively). The following tables (IV and V) present the raw data on conflict initiation for the countries in each category:

TABLE IV

	DEMOCRATIC CATEGORY	
STATE	**YEARS AS DEMOCRACY**	**CONFLICTUAL ACTS**
Italy	(52)	(06)
W.Germany	(10)	(01)
Germany	(10)	(01)
Britain	(98)	(18)
France	(89)	(16)
United States	(66)	(20)
	(325) Total Years	(62) Acts

TABLE V

STATE	NONDEMOCRATIC CATEGORY YEARS AS NON-DEMO.	CONFLICTUAL ACTS
Italy	(31)	(11)
Austria	(97)	(07)
China	(15)	(11)
Japan	(50)	(18)
Russia	(139)	(48)
Germany	(109)	(27)
Britain	(46)	(08)
France	(50)	(13)
	(537) Total Years	(143) Acts

After having determined the raw conflict initiation totals for both the democratic and nondemocratic categories, it was then possible to derive the hostility-level distributions for each type. That is, it was possible to generate the data to at least crudely evaluate the second hypothesis - that conflict initiated by democracies tends, on the average, to demonstrate a lower level of hostility than that initiated by nondemocracies. The following tables (VI and VII) present this data, as categorized according to the four-level hostility index. In scanning this data it should be noted that the total hostility value figures listed at the far right represent the total hostility of the acts initiated by each state (i.e. in Italy's case, for instance, the total hostility value of 12 is obtained by adding two acts at level 1, three acts at level 2, none at level 3, and one at level 4, or

TABLE VI

DEMOCRATIC CATEGORY

STATE	ACTS AS DEMO.	ACTS AT LEVEL 1	ACTS AT LEVEL 2	ACTS AT LEVEL 3	ACTS AT LEVEL 4	HOSTILITY VALUE
Italy	(06)	(02)	(03)	(00)	(01)	(12)
W.Germany	(01)	(00)	(01)	(00)	(00)	(02)
Germany	(01)	(01)	(00)	(00)	(00)	(01)
Britain	(18)	(10)	(06)	(01)	(01)	(29)
France	(16)	(09)	(03)	(03)	(01)	(28)
U.S.	(20)	(11)	(08)	(01)	(00)	(30)
	(62)	(33)	(21)	(05)	(03)	(102)

TABLE VII

NON DEMOCRATIC CATEGORY

STATE	ACTS AS NON-DEM.	ACTS AT LEVEL 1	ACTS AT LEVEL 2	ACTS AT LEVEL 3	ACTS AT LEVEL 4	HOSTILITY VALUE
Italy	(11)	(03)	(04)	(03)	(01)	(24)
Austria	(07)	(02)	(01)	(01)	(03)	(19)
China	(11)	(02)	(05)	(03)	(01)	(25)
Japan	(18)	(06)	(04)	(06)	(02)	(40)
Russia	(48)	(23)	(12)	(06)	(07)	(93)
Germany	(27)	(18)	(05)	(01)	(03)	(43)
Britain	(08)	(02)	(04)	(02)	(00)	(16)
France	(13)	(04)	(02)	(02)	(05)	(34)
	(143)	(60)	(37)	(24)	(22)	(294)

Taking Tables VI and VII and translating into percentages yields the following results:

TABLE VIII

HOSTILITY LEVELS FOR DEMOCRATIC STATES

	NUMBER (#)	PERCENTAGE (%)
ACTS AT LEVEL 1	(33)	(53.22)
ACTS AT LEVEL 2	(21)	(33.87)
ACTS AT LEVEL 3	(05)	(08.06)
ACTS AT LEVEL 4	(03)	(04.84)
	(62) Total Acts	(99.99%)

each state (i.e. in Italy's case, for instance, the total hostility value of 12 is obtained by adding two acts at level 1, three acts at level 2, none at level 3, and one at level 4, or $2(1) + 3(2) + 0(3) + 1(4) = 12$).

TABLE IX
HOSTILITY LEVELS FOR NONDEMOCRATIC STATES

	NUMBER (#)	PERCENTAGE (%)
ACTS AT LEVEL 1	(60)	(41.96)
ACTS AT LEVEL 2	(37)	(25.87)
ACTS AT LEVEL 3	(24)	(16.78)
ACTS AT LEVEL 4	(22)	(15.39)
	(143) Total Acts	(100%)

BUT WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN?

As Tables IV and V indicate, the first hypothesis - that democracies will initiate fewer conflictual acts than dictatorships - is essentially supported by the data.

Whereas democracies initiated a total of 62 conflictual acts within the context of 325 total democratic years, nondemocracies initiated 143 acts in 537 years. Dividing the number of initiated acts for democracies by the total number of democratic years (62/325) reveals an average of .1908 initiated acts per year for the democratic countries, as opposed to an average of .2662 (143/537) for those in the nondemocratic category.

In many respects, such results are further strengthened when considering some of the problems commonly associated with the construction and use of events data. If one accepts the argument that reliable data gathering is enhanced when the events in question are chronologically recent, then one could also expect a lower reporting rate for 19th, as opposed to 20th century, conflict activity. In other words, there is most likely a bias operating in the construction of long-range data sets such as that of Siverson and Tennefoss; a bias that results in a relative "under-reporting" of more chronologically distant activity.

A cursory perusal of the Siverson-Tennefoss data reveals that such suspicions may be well founded. Indeed, in terms of event distribution, the data set lists just 46 conflictual events for the first 46 years of the survey (1821-1867) and just 74 for the first 78 years (1821-1899). On the other hand, there are no less than 182 entries listed for the 1900-1965 period (65 years). Rather than conclude that systemic conflict increased three-fold after 1900, it would appear that the authors underestimate the incidence of conflict which occurred between 1821-1867, when no democracies were involved in the survey, and between 1867-1899, when democracies remained few in number. As such, there is reason to believe that the demonstrated conflict initiation averages (.1908 and .2662, respectively) would have been, if anything, more skewed in favor of the democratic states without this bias in the data. Thus, by underestimating the conflictual activity occurring during periods dominated by nondemocratic states, the Siverson-Tennefoss data may actually work to present the behavior of authoritarian regimes in a more "peaceful" light than deserved.

With respect to the second hypothesis, that the conflictual acts initiated by democracies will, on the average, be grouped more at the lower levels of the hostility scale, the results presented in Tables VI and VII also provide clear support. Dividing the total hostility value of democratic initiated acts by the number of acts (102/62) yields an average hostility value of 1.65 per act (on a scale of, again, 1.00 - 4.00). In contrast, performing the same basic calculation for conflict initiated by the countries in the dictatorship category yields a distinctly less favorable hostility value of 2.06 per act (293/143).

Consistent with possessing a lower hostility average per act, democratic initiated conflict is also more extensively distributed at the lower (one and two) levels of the hostility index. Whereas 87.5% of all democratic conflictual activity occurred at levels one and two, only 67.8% of nondemocratic conflictual activity was found at those levels. Conversely, 32.2% of all nondemocratic initiated conflict occurred at levels three and four, as opposed to only 12.5% of the total acts initiated by democracies (see Tables VIII and IX here).

In addition to these findings, a casual inspection of some of the data reveals another, less obvious relationship. In contrast to Quincy Wright's assertion that the same states appear to be equally "war-prone" as democracies and nondemocracies, the data culled from Siverson-Tennefoss indicates that those countries which made the transition from dictatorship to democracy subsequently demonstrated a decrease in their incidence of conflict. In the case of France, that country's rate of initiated conflict

dropped from .260 acts per year (13/50) while a nondemocracy to .179 acts per year (16/89) as a democracy. Similarly, although Italy/Sardinia experienced several democratic/nondemocratic transitions, its conflict initiation average was more than three times higher (.354 to .115) when under authoritarian rule. Lastly, Prussia/Germany committed just one act of initiated conflict as a democracy, as opposed to 27 acts as a nondemocracy.

In most cases, a drop in the average level of hostility per act also accompanied a nation's movement to democracy. Whereas conflict initiated by France as a nondemocracy exhibited an average hostility level of 2.61, that average falls substantially (to 1.75) with the establishment of democratic institutions. Less dramatic but still significant declines also occurred for both Great Britain and Germany: from 2.00 to 1.61 for the former, and from 1.59 to 1.00 for the latter.

SOME (AS ALWAYS) TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS:

In general, then, the results of this analysis tend to lend substantial support to claims linking democratic government to less bellicose foreign policies. Indeed, democracies not only initiate conflict less frequently than dictatorships, but they also tend to rely upon less aggressive tactics (as measured by the different hostility levels) when doing so. In addition, countries in the sample which experienced both authoritarian and democratic phases (Britain, France, Germany, and Italy) appear to have pursued more peaceful foreign policies when under the influence of democratic institutions and practices. That such behavior stems from certain features of democracy - freedom of speech and press, periodic elections, greater elite accountability, etc. - is far from proven, but consistent with both the findings and the broader assumptions of the democratic peace theory. Thus, while democracy may not necessarily be acting as a "relentless social force for peace," it can, based on these findings, claim a more peaceful record in international politics than dictatorship.

While the results of the present analysis tend to support the democratic peace theory, it is important to note before closing that the Siverson-Tennefoss data can also be used to explore other dimensions of the argument. While a more exhaustive treatment would be required, a cursory perusal of the data reveals a total of 79 incidents of conflict between major powers. Of these 79, only nine were between democratic states and none of those cases involved Level Four hostility (i.e., war). This data which reconfirms the absence of war between democratic states in the 19th and 20th centuries. On the other hand, there were 27 cases of conflict between non-democratic states, with the average level of hostility demonstrated in those acts registering significantly higher (a mean of 2.02) than for conflict between democracies (a mean of 1.4). While this still leaves us with a majority of cases (43) involving conflict between democratic and non-democratic states, it must also noted that it was the authoritarian states that initiated the overwhelming majority (33) of those clashes. While only a crude "first cut" at the data, there is nothing here which casts doubt on the democratic peace theory or any of its corollaries.

It is possible to explore still other facets of the democratic-peace theory through use of the Siverson-Tennefoss data. The argument that, however conducive to peace democracy may be, the process of "democratization" itself is conducive to war in the short-term could be explored through careful attention to the periods prior to and after transition from the authoritarian to democratic category. In a related sense, the impact of democratic consolidation could be examined by looking at trends in conflict initia-

tion rates for "recent" and "well-established" democracies. It would also be of interest to update the Siverson/Tennefoss data set for the post-1965 era, and perhaps thereby allow for an assessment of the war-proneness of different regime types in late-Cold War and post-Cold War environments to be made.

But these are simply suggestions for future research; research that can move the debate forward by incorporating some of the modest changes proposed by, and integrated into, the present study. What is important at this point is that a scholarly consensus is in the process of forming, one that verifies the basic assumptions of the democratic-peace theory and suggests that a genuine "zone of peace" is indeed developing among liberal democracies. In contrast to "realist" theories of international politics, which emphasize the structure of the international system and the balance of power as the key determinants of nation-state behavior, the democratic peace theory suggests that what happens within nations might be important as well. In this sense it, appropriately, redirects our attention to the "politics" at the heart of international politics as a discipline.

APPENDIX
Siverson and Tennefoss Data Set on Interstate Conflicts

Conflict Events by Date, Actors, and Hostility Level

Event	Date	Hostility	Initiator	Target
1	March 1821	3	Russia	Turkey
2	April 1821	2	Sardinia/Italy	Austria
3	April 1823	4	France	Spain
4	January 1827	2	Sardinia/Italy	Austria
5	August 1827	4	Russia	Turkey
6	April 1828	4	Russia	Turkey
7	July 1830	2	Austria	Papal States
8	August 1830	3	France	Holland
9	May 1831	3	Holland	France
10	December 1832	3	Great Britain	Turkey
11	December 1832	1	France	Great Britain
12	April 1838	3	France	Mexico
13	July 1840	3	Great Britain	France
14	September 1840	1	Prussia	France
15	June 1845	2	Great Britain	Argentina
16	July 1847	2	Austria	Sardinia/Italy
17	March 1848	4	Sardinia/Italy	Austria
18	March 1848	4	Prussia	Denmark
19	August 1848	2	Sardinia/Italy	Austria
20	February 1849	4	Austria	France
21	March 1849	1	Denmark	Prussia
22	May 1849	2	Tuscany	Austria
23	May 1849	1	Prussia	Austria
24	June 1849	2	France	Two Sicilies
25	October 1849	1	Russia	Turkey
26	January 1850	2	Great Britain	Greece
27	February 1851	2	France	Russia
28	January 1852	1	Austria	Turkey
29	March 1852	1	France	Belgium
30	June 1853	4	Russia	Turkey
31	March 1854	2	Great Britain	Greece
32	June 1856	1	Switzerland	Russia
33	June 1856	2	Great Britain	Russia
34	October 1856	4	Persia/Iran	Great Britain
35	March 1857	1	Great Britain	France
36	April 1859	4	Austria	Sardinia/Italy
37	May 1860	2	France	Sardinia/Italy
38	September 1860	1	France	Sardinia/Italy
39	March 1861	2	Russia	Japan
40	October 1861	4	France	Mexico
41	November 1861	1	United States	Great Britain
42	June 1863	3	Japan	France
43	September 1863	1	Great Britain	Russia
44	February 1864	4	Denmark	Prussia
45	June 1866	4	Prussia	Austria
46	April 1867	1	France	Prussia
47	October 1867	2	Sardinia/Italy	France
48	January 1869	1	France	Great Britain
49	May 1870	4	France	Prussia
50	June 1870	2	China	France
51	February 1875	1	Germany	France
52	July 1875	4	Russia	Turkey
53	November 1878	1	Russia	Great Britain
54	September 1879	1	China	Russia
55	June 1880	1	Great Britain	Turkey

APPENDIX (continued)

Event	Date	Hostility	Initiator	Target
56	May 1881	3	France	Sardinia/Italy
57	April 1883	1	Germany	Great Britain
58	September 1883	1	Great Britain	Russia
59	May 1884	4	France	China
60	November 1884	2	Great Britain	Russia
61	April 1886	2	Great Britain	Greece
62	November 1886	1	Russia	Austria
63	April 1887	1	Germany	France
64	February 1888	1	France	Sardinia/Italy
65	January 1890	1	Great Britain	Portugal
66	May 1893	3	Great Britain	France
67	January 1896	1	Germany	Great Britain
68	February 1896	2	Russia	Greece
69	January 1897	1	France	Great Britain
70	February 1897	1	Russia	Great Britain
71	March 1897	1	Russia	Great Britain
72	April 1897	1	Russia	Serbia
73	November 1897	2	Germany	China
74	September 1898	1	France	Great Britain
75	January 1900	1	Great Britain	Germany
76	January 1900	1	France	Dom. Repub.
77	March 1900	1	Russia	Japan
78	June 1900	3	China	Germany
79	February 1901	1	Russia	China
80	December 1902	2	Great Britain	Venezuela
81	January 1903	1	Germany	Dom. Repub.
82	February 1903	2	Turkey	Russia
83	April 1903	3	Russia	Japan
84	April 1903	3	Russia	Japan
85	October 1904	1	Great Britain	Russia
86	March 1905	2	Germany	France
87	November 1905	2	Turkey	Austria
88	May 1906	1	Great Britain	Turkey
89	October 1908	1	Austria	Russia
90	December 1909	2	United States	Nicaragua
91	May 1911	1	Germany	France
92	September 1911	4	Sardinia/Italy	Turkey
93	November 1911	2	Russia	Persia/Iran
94	January 1912	2	United States	Honduras
95	October 1912	1	Russia	Bulgaria
96	November 1913	1	Turkey	Russia
97	April 1914	2	United States	Mexico
98	July 1914	4	Austria	Serbia
99	January 1915	1	Japan	China
100	March 1916	3	Mexico	United States
101	September 1916	2	Japan	China
102	February 1918	1	United States	Mexico
103	February 1919	2	Italy	Yugoslavia
104	March 1919	1	France	Hungary
105	April 1919	2	Italy	Turkey
106	June 1919	1	Germany	Italy
107	April 1920	2	France	Germany
108	June 1920	3	Turkey	Great Britain
109	August 1920	2	Albania	Italy
110	January 1921	1	United States	Peru
111	February 1921	1	United States	Panama
112	November 1921	1	France	Italy
113	March 1921	2	France	Germany
114	September 1922	1	Turkey	Great Britain

APPENDIX (continued)

Event	Date	Hostility	Initiator	Target
115	January 1923	2	Lithuania	Germany
116	January 1923	2	Russia	Mongolia
117	January 1923	2	Poland	Russia
118	January 1923	2	Poland	Germany
119	January 1923	2	France	Germany
120	May 1923	1	Russia	Switzerland
121	August 1923	2	Italy	Greece
122	October 1923	1	France	Great Britain
123	February 1926	1	Italy	Germany
124	May 1926	2	United States	Nicaragua
125	January 1927	1	Italy	Yugoslavia
126	January 1927	2	Russia	Great Britain
127	May 1927	1	Great Britain	Russia
128	May 1927	1	Russia	Great Britain
129	January 1928	3	Yemen	Great Britain
130	April 1928	1	Japan	China
131	January 1929	3	Russia	China
132	March 1931	1	France	Germany
133	April 1931	1	Germany	Poland
134	September 1931	4	Japan	China
135	July 1932	1	Japan	Russia
136	November 1932	2	Great Britain	Iran
137	January 1933	2	Japan	China
138	March 1933	1	Germany	Poland
139	March 1933	1	Germany	Austria
140	June 1933	1	Japan	Russia
141	March 1934	1	Germany	France
142	June 1934	2	Italy	Albania
143	July 1934	1	Italy	Germany
144	October 1934	1	France	Germany
145	October 1934	1	Yugoslavia	Italy
146	December 1934	3	Italy	Ethiopia
147	May 1935	1	Japan	China
148	July 1935	1	Germany	Poland
149	October 1935	4	Italy	Ethiopia
150	October 1935	3	Japan	Russia
151	December 1935	1	Russia	Uruguay
152	March 1936	3	Japan	Russia
153	March 1936	2	Germany	France
154	June 1936	4	China	Japan
155	July 1936	3	Italy	Russia
156	September 1936	2	Japan	China
157	November 1936	1	Germany	France
158	January 1937	2	Italy	Great Britain
159	June 1937	1	Germany	France
160	July 1937	3	Russia	Japan
161	July 1937	3	Japan	China
162	December 1937	1	Turkey	France
163	December 1937	2	Japan	United States
164	February 1938	2	Germany	Austria
165	May 1938	1	Germany	Czechoslovakia
166	May 1938	3	Japan	Russia
167	September 1938	1	Germany	Czechoslovakia
168	December 1938	1	Italy	France
169	February 1939	2	Japan	France
170	March 1939	2	Germany	Czechoslovakia
171	March 1939	1	Germany	Lithuania
172	April 1939	2	Italy	Albania
173	May 1939	4	Japan	Russia

APPENDIX (continued)

Event	Date	Hostility	Initiator	Target
174	September 1939	4	Germany	Poland
175	November 1939	4	Russia	Finland
176	November 1939	1	Italy	France
177	June 1940	1	Russia	Latvia
178	June 1940	1	Russia	Estonia
179	June 1940	1	Russia	Lithuania
180	June 1940	2	Russia	Romania
181	August 1940	1	Japan	France
182	October 1940	3	Italy	Greece
183	December 1940	3	France	Thailand
184	June 1941	3	Germany	Russia
185	December 1941	4	Japan	United States
186	October 1945	1	Egypt	United States
187	November 1945	1	Russia	Iran
188	May 1946	2	Albania	Great Britain
189	June 1946	1	Great Britain	Iran
190	July 1948	2	Russia	United States
191	July 1949	1	Russia	Yugoslavia
192	January 1950	1	Poland	United States
193	June 1950	4	North Korea	United States
194	July 1951	1	United States	Czechoslovakia
195	September 1951	2	Iran	Great Britain
196	November 1951	1	Russia	Yugoslavia
197	January 1952	2	Great Britain	Egypt
198	January 1954	1	United States	Guatemala
199	August 1954	1	China	Taiwan
200	January 1955	3	China	Taiwan
201	July 1956	3	China	Burma
202	July 1956	1	Egypt	Great Britain
203	October 1956	4	Russia	Hungary
204	October 1956	4	Great Britain	Egypt
205	October 1956	1	Morocco	France
206	October 1956	1	Russia	Poland
207	November 1956	2	Russia	Hungary
208	May 1957	1	China	United States
209	August 1957	1	Syria	United States
210	September 1957	3	France	Tunisia
211	October 1957	1	United States	Haiti
212	October 1957	1	Russia	Turkey
213	July 1958	1	United States	Iraq
214	August 1958	2	China	Taiwan
215	August 1958	3	China	India
216	November 1958	1	Russia	United States
217	January 1959	2	Ireland	Great Britain
218	October 1959	3	China	India
219	October 1959	1	United States	China
220	December 1959	2	China	Nepal
221	December 1959	2	China	Taiwan
222	April 1960	1	Russia	United States
223	May 1960	2	Russia	United States
224	July 1960	2	Russia	United States
225	July 1960	1	Russia	United States
226	August 1960	2	West Germany	East Germany
227	January 1961	1	Iraq	Britain
228	February 1961	1	United States	Russia
229	April 1961	2	United States	Cuba
230	May 1961	2	United States	North Vietnam
231	June 1961	1	Russia	United States
232	June 1961	3	United States	North Vietnam

APPENDIX (continued)

Event	Date	Hostility	Initiator	Target
233	July 1961	1	Great Britain	Iraq
234	July 1961	3	Tunisia	France
235	August 1961	1	East Germany	West Germany
236	October 1961	1	East Germany	United States
237	February 1962	2	Russia	United States
238	June 1962	1	United States	China
239	August 1962	2	United States	Cuba
240	September 1962	4	India	China
241	September 1962	1	Russia	United States
242	March 1963	3	Russia	China
243	April 1963	2	United States	Haiti
244	January 1964	1	Panama	United States
245	January 1964	1	Great Britain	Indonesia
246	February 1964	1	Russia	United States
247	March 1964	2	East Germany	United States
248	March 1964	2	Cambodia	Great Britain
249	March 1964	2	Great Britain	Yemen
250	June 1964	1	United States	Turkey
251	July 1964	3	China	Malaysia
252	August 1964	3	Indonesia	Great Britain
253	December 1964	2	Indonesia	United States
254	January 1965	1	Indonesia	United States